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Summary 
This research produced evidence about the contribution of 
investment and other sources to the growth process of Latin America 
during 1960-2002, and provided answers to the questions listed above 
unless from an historical perspective. The combined growth 
accounting and regression analysis, and used data for the six largest 
Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, and Venezuela. These countries produce nearly 90 per cent of 
Latin America’s GDP.  
Alternative growth accounting methodologies were used to 
measure the contributions of the sources of growth to GDP growth 
during 1960-2002. The study also provides evidence of the effects of 
investments in machinery and equipment and construction structures, 
and the effects of private and public investment on per capita GDP 
growth.  
The research found evidence of the primary role played by total 
factor productivity in explaining the difference between fast and slow 
growth experiences. Extending the traditional growth accounting 
approach did not change this conclusion. It also found that investment 
in machinery and equipment, and private investment were most 
effective in raising per capita GDP growth, but that key policy related 
variables, including education, were essential ingredients contributing 
to per capita GDP growth. Evidence of mutual causality between 
private investment and growth, and inconclusive evidence regarding 
the incidence of FDI and infrastructure on private investment were also 
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Introduction 
The modest recovery of Latin America after a period of 
stabilization and reforms that followed the 1980s debt crisis has added 
momentum to the interest in the factors that contribute to economic 
growth in the region and, in particular, about the role played by 
investment as a source of economic growth. Under a new outward-
looking development approach growth and investment recovered during 
the 1990s and early 2000s from the slump of the 1980s. The recovery 
has been modest, however. Growth performance has not yet reached the 
growth rate levels observed in 1960s and 1970s and remain well below 
those observed Asia, Middle East, and Eastern Europe. 
Disagreement persists about the role of investment in the growth 
process. Some authors have concluded that investment has been the 
main factor explaining economic growth. In a study for East Asia, 
Young (1994) concluded that investment was the main source of 
growth in the experience of the East Asian economies. Other 
economists have acknowledged the important role played by fixed 
investment but argued that productivity has been the engine that has 
marked the difference between fast and slow growth experiences 
(Blomstrom et.al. 1996; Harberger, 1996 and 1998; Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clarke, 1997b. Elias (1992) produced evidence showing 
that total factor productivity explained about one-third of GDP growth 
in Latin America during 1940-85. In a more recent study, Solimano 
and Soto (2004) produced evidence showing that total factor 
productivity had the most important factor explaining the evolution of 
GDP growth in Latin America during 1960-2002. Some other 
economists have focused on specific categories of investment. 
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Some have emphasized the role of machinery as a main determinant of a country’s economic growth 
(De Long and Summers, 1991 and 1993). Others have found evidence of a positive correlation 
between growth and private investment and the potential complementarities between private 
investment and public investment (Kahn and Kumar, 1997; Kahn and Reinhart, 1990; Serven and 
Solimano, 1992; and Greene and Villanueva, 1991). The roles played by foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and infrastructure as factors contributing to growth have been also documented, but the evidence 
is more controversial, however. The roles of FDI have been addressed by Lim (2001), Borensztein et. 
al (1998), and Olosfsdotter (1998). The roles of infrastructure have been addressed by Easterly and 
Serven eds., 2003 and Moguillansky and Bielchowsky (2000) for Latin America. 
The role assigned to investment in the process of economic growth is relevant to growth 
theory and policy making. Should countries focus on increasing investment rates through, for 
example, massive investment programs in order to accelerate the pace of economic growth? What 
types of investments have the strongest impacts in raising growth? What is the role played by 
productivity? What are the roles played by economic policies as factors contributing to investment 
and growth? Are there reinforcing effects between investment and growth?  
This study produces evidence about the contribution of investment and other sources to the 
growth process of Latin America during 1960-2002, and provide answers to the questions listed above 
unless from an historical perspective. In our research we combine growth accounting and regression 
analysis to reinforce our conclusions, which confirm and qualify some previous findings about the 
process of economic investment, growth, and productivity in Latin America during 1960-2002. 
We have used data for the six largest Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. These countries produce nearly 90% of Latin America’s GDP 
(WDI, 2004, World Bank). The selection of countries and period was also based on the availability 
and quality of the data. Reliable national accounts data before 1960 is either not available for many 
Latin American countries and the quality of disaggregated investment data by type of assets and 
sectors is either non existent or weak.  
We examine the investment-growth process under three perspectives. First, we use alternative 
growth accounting methodologies to measure the contributions of the sources of growth to GDP 
growth during 1960-2002 (Section I). Secondly, we estimate the effects of investments in 
machinery and equipment and construction structures (Section II). Thirdly, we estimate the effects 
of private and public investment on per capita GDP growth (Section III). Our main findings are 
summarized in Section IV.  
In our research we found that investment has played an important role in the six largest Latin 
American countries but that total factor productivity has made the difference between faster and 
slower growth experiences (across time and countries). In line with endogenous growth theory, we 
then explored the main factors that contributed to the productivity differences in the region. We use 
per capita GDP growth as a proxy for productivity growth and we found that the composition of 
investment and policy related factor have been main factors explaining per capita GDP growth. We 
found that investment in the form of machinery and equipment and private investment have been 
effective in boosting per capita growth, but that some key policy related variables affecting have 
helped to explain the difference between fast and slow growth countries and episodes during 1960-
2002. We also show evidence about a reverse causality between private investment and GDP 
growth, which helps explain some of the virtuous and vicious cycles in Latin America, especially at 
times of prolonged recessions and expansions. We also examined the stability of the findings and 
qualified them as needed. We found that the incidence on economic growth have not only varied 
across the key growth determinant factors but also along the 1960-2002 period. In some sub-periods 
some key variables have been more relevant than in others. The main long-run trends and 
conclusions are not severely affected by the structural shifts, however. 
8 
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I.  Sources of growth: capital, labor, 
and total factor productivity 
In this section we run an exercise on growth accounting to obtain 
estimates of the contribution of investment to real GDP growth for the 
six Latin American countries considered in our sample. The growth 
accounting approach has some advantages compared to the regression 
approach for measuring the contributions of the three broad categories of 
sources of growth (capital, labor, and total factor productivity) (Barro 
1999, Klenow-Rodriguez 1997, Pack 1994, and Easterly 2001). The 
growth accounting approach overcomes three main problems present in 
the regression approach for measuring the growth sources: (a) the 
changes in capital and labor are usually endogenous to total factor 
productivity; (b) if the changes in capital and labor are measured with 
errors, the regression coefficients would be inconsistent estimates of the 
shares of capital and labor (this problem aggravates when the capital 
stock is not adjusted by “utilization” of the capital stock; (c) regression 
estimates usually assume no variations in factor shares and total factor 
productivity through time and across countries. 
The growth accounting approach has also some disadvantages, 
however. Its main limitation stem from the use of factor prices to 
estimate factor contributions to real GDP growth. Deviations between 
factor prices and marginal products would be included in measured total 
factor productivity (the residual in the growth accounting). As long as 
we interpret total factor productivity as a broad measure of “real cost 
reductions”, however, those deviations could be considered as correctly 
forming part of the residual interpreted, broadly interpreted as a measure 
of economy wide real cost reductions (Harberger, 1996). 
9 
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A. Methodology: “Traditional Modified” and “Extended” 
Approaches 
To obtain the growth accounting estimates for the six Latin American countries we will develop 
and apply two approaches. We will build a “traditional modified” approach (TMA) and an “extended” 
approach (EA). Under the TMA we generate capital stock series using the series on gross capital 
formation at constant prices of each country, a usual practice in most growth accounting exercises, but 
we innovate by decomposing the wage bill between the payments to “raw labor” and to “human 
capital”. We use a proxy for the remuneration of raw labor to deflate the wage bill and obtain the two 
separate labor components. Through this exercise we want to determine if the conclusions about the 
contributions of the three basic sources of growth on economic growth are sensitive to the growth 
accounting methodology. We show below that enriching the traditional growth accounting framework 
with some strong deviations did not changed the main conclusions. The modifications and extensions 
that we introduce to the traditional growth accounting approach also allow us to obtain additional 
insights into the growth process. 
In the EA we decompose the wage bill series between the raw and human capital 
components, as in the TMA but, in addition, we generate an alternative series of physical capital, 
deflating the gross capital formation series at current prices by the GDP deflator, and adjust the 
capital series to reflect the “utilization” of physical capital. We also use a notion of “invested” 
physical capital, in line with capital theory by expressing capital stock series in the same GDP 
basket units as GDP at constant prices: GDP units of capital are used or invested to generate GDP 
(both capital and GDP expressed in the same GDP basket units). In both approaches we use annual 
shares of labor and physical capital for each of the six countries during 1960-2002. Most growth 
accounting exercises use constant factor shares across time and countries, limitations that contribute 
to distort the derived total factor productivity series. 
We start from the basic national accounts identity where output is distributed between the 
payments to capital and labor: 
 
(1) nLnKpy ωρ +=  
  
Real changes are expressed as: 
 
(2) RLKy +∆+∆=∆ ωρ    
  
y  = real GDP 
p  = GDP deflator 
K  = real capital stock 
L  = employed labor force 
nρ = nominal return of capital 
nω  = nominal wage rate 
ρ  = real gross of depreciation return to capital = real net return to capital ( rρ ) + depreciation (δ ). 
ω  = average wage 
R  = residual = total factor productivity = real cost reductions 
10 
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In growth accounting it is usual to refer to the residual R  as total factor productivity or “real 
cost reductions” (Harberger, 1998 and 1996). In terms of annual percent changes we can derive the 
contributions of each factor to real GDP growth and the contribution of total factor productivity (or 











LK +∆+∆=∆  
 




∆= ρ = share of capital in output 
py
LSL
∆= ω  = share of labor in output 
 
The interpretation of equation (3), as the sources of growth equation (measuring the 
contributions of physical capital, labor, and total factor productivity to output growth) builds on the 
assumption that factor payments are good approximations of marginal products. Any deviations 
between factor payments and marginal products ( ρ−KMP ) and ( ω−LMP ) would be reflected in 
R and *R . These deviations stem from all types of distortions that make factor payments deviate 
from marginal products such as economies of scale and taxes. However, as long as these distortions 
raise production costs, then, they should be appropriately reflected in *R  if we interpret it as 
reflecting all type of real cost changes in the economy.  
Equation (3) can also be derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function  
with: , or any production function homogeneous of degree one. But the specification of 
a production function is not a pre-requisite to the sources of growth equation (3).  
LK SS LAKy =
1=+ LK SS
Equation (3) represents the “traditional” growth accounting equation used in most growth 
accounting studies. We will now deviate from the traditional approach along two roads. We first 
proceed to decompose the wage bill between the component representing the payments to “raw” 
labor and the component representing the payments to the quality or “human capital” component. 
We will then proceed to generate the series of “invested” physical capital. We follow these roads 
based on the “two deflators” approach developed by Harberger (1998), but we also add additional 
extensions. We derive series of physical capital series adjusted for utilization rates. Let us first 





ωLL =  = raw labor equivalent units of the wage bill 
 
*ω  = wage rate of raw labor. 
 
Then, the wage bill can be decomposed as: 
 
)( *** LLLL ∆−∆+∆=∆ ωωω  
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wage bill = payments to raw labor + payments to the human capital component (human capital 
maintenance + human capital upgrade).1 
 











y +∆−∆+∆+∆=∆ ωω  
 
Growth of real GDP = contribution of physical capital + direct contribution of raw labor + 
direct contribution of the quality improvement of the labor force (human capital) + contribution of 
total factor productivity ( *R ). 
An “ideal” decomposition of labor payments (into raw labor and the human capital 
component) should be derived by using as raw labor wage deflator the most representative wage 
index of unskilled labor. A proxy for this could be wage for textiles workers as mentioned by 
Harberger (1998), a proxy for the wage bill of low skilled workers. We examined this possibility 
using the International Labor Office (ILO) statistics but we found serious problems regarding the 
quality, time consistency, data gaps. We decided to use instead a fictitious defined low skilled wage 
category defining its average wage as equal to 2/3 of per capital GDP.2 The use of annual factor 
shares is crucial in our work not only to better capture the contributions of capital and labor to the 
growth but also to obtain series for the raw labor and human capital components of the labor share.3 
To further generate what we call the EA we further expressed the physical capital series in 
terms of “GDP baskets.” The growth accounting interpretation of this alternative *K  series is better 
associated with capital theory: *K units of capital are invested to obtain GDP with both expressed 
in the same units (GDP baskets). In addition, we adjust the physical capital series to reflect the 
notion of “utilized” physical capital a vector of “rates of utilization”, which we approximate by the 
ratios of actual GDP to “potential” GDP. We define “potential” GDP as a centered seven-year 
moving average of actual GDP.4 
 
*K = physical capital series derived the series of fixed capital formation at current prices deflated 





yKK =  
Rate of utilization of capital = )(
py
yRUK =  
                                                     
1  A further decomposition of the human capital component, between the part due to human capital maintenance and the part due to human 









LLLLL ∆−∆+∆−+∆=∆ ωωωω  
2  This proxy is also used by Harberger (1996). Using his words: “ … those who earn 2/3 of a year’s GDP are overwhelmingly poor, low 
skilled, and with relative low levels of human capital.”  
3  The total labor share presents some important variations though time and countries. The ranges for the period 1960-2002 are: Argentina 
(40%-60%); Brazil (60%-80%); Chile ( 60%-65%); Colombia (50%-67%); Mexico (36%-60%); and Venezuela (44%-75%). Data on 
shares were obtained from Hoffman (2000) and Eclac/UN national account statistics. The labor share has been adjusted to include own 
account workers. The capital share (1-total labor share) assimilates to the national accounts concept of physical capital (which excludes 
land and other non-reproducible or intangible assets). 
4  A similar procedure is used in Loayza et. al. 2002 and based on the Baxter and King work on business cycles (1999). 
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y +∆−∆+∆+∆=∆ ωω  
 
Growth of real GDP = contribution of ‘invested” capital + direct contribution of raw labor + 
direct contribution of the quality improvement of the labor force (human capital) + contribution of 
adjusted total factor productivity ( **R ).  
The capital stock series are derived in both approaches using a perpetual inventory method 
and based on the following capital equation: 
(6) )21()1(1
δδ −+−=+ ttt IKK   
 
tI  = gross fixed capital formation: (i) at constant prices in the TMA, and (ii) in GDP baskets in the 
EA. 
 
The initial capital stock (1960) is calculated with the expression: 
δ+= k
I
K 00  
 
This expression assumes that around the initial year (1960 in our case) capital is growing at 
the same pace as GDP (a steady state assumption). We take = average annual real GDP growth 
during 1955-75. We take 
k
δ = 4% (similar value used in growth accounting estimates by Loayza et 
al 2002, and Nehru 1993). We preferred to use declining balance depreciation instead of straight 
line depreciation as the former assimilates better to the concept of economic depreciation 
(efficiency and obsolescence makes older capital stock increasingly less valuable through time). 
The value of initial investment  is obtained running a simple regression of gross fixed capital 
formation against time for the period 1955-1965, taking the intercept as the value estimate for .
0I
0I 5/6 
In summary, the characteristics of our two growth accounting methodologies would be: 
(1) Traditional Modified Approach (TMA): (a) the wage bill is decomposed between the raw 
labor and quality (or human capital upgrade) components; and (b) the physical capital 
stock series, generated using the series of gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
(in local currency). The TMA is basically the traditional growth accounting modified by 
splitting the labor contribution between a part due to raw labor and another due to its 
quality or human capital component.  
(2) Extended Approach (EA): (a) the wage bill is decomposed between the raw labor and 
quality (or human capital); (b) the physical capital stock series are generated using the 
series of gross fixed capital formation at current prices (in local currency), deflated by the 
GDP deflator, and adjusted to reflect the actual utilization of physical capital. 
                                                     
5  In our capital equation (6) we use )21(
δ−tI  instead of as we are measuring capital at the beginning of each year and gross 
investment depreciates through the year. We assumes fixed investment depreciates at half the annual depreciation in each year. This 
modification has a negligible impact on the capital stock series (about 0.2 percents differences, in the annual percent changes in the capital 
stock series obtained using our equation against the traditional equation), however.  
6  The gross fixed capital formation series we use are in national currency units. The source are Eclac and UN Statistical Office. We updated 
the last seven years of the series using the most recent national account data obtained directly from the original country sources.  
 tI
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B. Results 
We applied both growth accounting methodologies to a sample of six Latin American 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. We took the period 1960-
2002. Our six countries are the largest countries of the region and produce about 90% of total Latin 
America’s GDP (WDI, 2004, World Bank). The selection of countries and the period was based on 
the availability and quality of the data. Reliable national accounts data before 1960 are not available 
for many Latin American countries. The selected countries have longer and better quality national 
account series and more frequent revisions of the national account statistics than other smaller 
countries in the region. 
We have distinguish four broad periods in Latin America’s growth experience: (1) The 
1960s, representing the last “gold decade” of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy 
combined with mixed external conditions (falling terms of trade but low real external interest rates); 
(2) the 1970s, representing the accelerated decay of the ISI model and mixed external conditions 
(improved terms of trade for oil exporters but falling terms of trade for non-oil exporters, and low 
real external interest rates);7 (3) The 1980s, representing the debt crisis and lost “decade”, which 
marks the accelerated transition from the ISI to a new export-led development strategy, a period of 
stabilization and reforms combined with deteriorated external conditions (falling terms of trade and 
higher real external interest rates, compared to the 1970s); and (4) the 1990s and early 2000s, 
associated with the gradual insertion of Latin America into the new globalization era: growth 
recovers but modestly compared to the 1960s and 1970s, adverse external conditions prevail 
(falling terms of trade, higher external interest rates during 1999-2000, and negative contagion from 
a series of shocks (Asia 1997, Russia 1998, Brazil 1999, Argentina 2001-2002). In the early 2000s 
the globalization experience has been subjected to growing scrutiny by economists and politicians 
in Washington and across the region.  
For additional analytical insights we further sub-divided the four broad periods into five-year 
sub-periods, except for the last one (1996-2002) which contains seven years. We divided the six 
countries into a group of faster growth countries (FGCs) (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico) and 
a group of slower growth countries (SLCs) (Argentina and Venezuela). This classification was 
based on the accumulated growth performance for the whole 1960-2002 period. The FGCs reached 
levels of real GDP by 2002 more than five times the levels in 1960 while the SGCs reached GDP 
levels less than three times the real GDP levels in 1960 and also developed a downward GDP trend 
since the mid-1990s (Figure 1). 
Tables 1a and 1b summarize the results from the growth accounting exercises. Table 1a shows 
the result associated with the TMA exercise and table 1b show the results from applying the EA. Our 
first observation is about the broad results obtained under each approach. The trends and structures of 
the growth sources are similar under TMA (table 1a) and the EA (table 1b), which is a comforting in 
the sense that our main analytical observations and conclusions will not depend on the alternative 
methodologies used. Some relevant insights emerge from the TMA and EA, however. 
                                                     
7  The 1970s is also called a period of debt-led growth as Latin America’s foreign indebtedness rose significantly induced by the oil shock of 
1973 and 1979, negative real interest rates, weakened commodity prices by the mid-1970s, and deteriorated economic conditions 
reflecting the agony of the old import substitution and state dirigisme model (see Thorp (1998)). The lending boom and “herd” related 
effect induced a debt led growth in the 1970s was in also seen in the 1990s, but with less systematic negative effects than in the 1980s. 
14 
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Figure 1 
REAL GDP GROWTH 
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Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
 
Table 1a 
TRADITIONAL MODIFIED GROWTH ACCOUNTING APPROACH (TMA) a 
Country 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-02 1961-02
                      
Argentina          
GDP growth  3.99 4.02 3.12 2.96 -2.43 -0.33 6.70 -0.28 2.22
Capital contribution 2.19 1.77 2.17 2.22 1.31 0.40 0.80 1.37 1.53
   Share of GDP growth 54.93 44.09 69.47 75.21 54.07 119.03 11.94 482.39 68.98
Raw labor contribution 0.39 0.39 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.28 0.20
   Share of GDP growth 9.66 9.65 7.79 7.98 2.43 13.43 -0.97 96.85 8.83
Human capital contribution 0.44 0.50 0.30 0.25 0.05 0.04 -0.09 0.25 0.22
   Share of GDP growth 10.96 12.56 9.75 8.41 1.94 12.22 -1.33 87.15 9.82
Total factor productivity 0.98 1.35 0.41 0.25 -3.85 -0.82 6.05 -2.18 0.27
   Share of GDP growth 24.45 33.70 13.00 8.40 -158.44 -244.69 90.35 -766.39 12.37
Brazil   
GDP growth  4.58 7.80 10.32 6.70 1.20 2.09 3.16 2.03 4.73
Capital contribution 1.02 1.46 3.00 3.22 1.72 1.31 0.72 0.86 1.66
   Share of GDP growth 22.21 18.71 29.10 48.07 143.41 62.43 22.68 42.30 35.11
Raw labor contribution 0.52 0.52 0.82 0.88 0.64 0.66 0.61 0.47 0.64
   Share of GDP growth 11.44 6.63 7.92 13.06 53.49 31.74 19.23 23.00 13.50
Human capital contribution 1.56 1.38 1.62 1.52 1.04 1.03 0.91 0.66 1.21
   Share of GDP growth 33.95 17.67 15.73 22.71 86.37 49.21 28.78 32.32 25.63
Total factor productivity 1.48 4.44 4.87 1.08 -2.20 -0.91 0.93 0.05 1.22
   Share of GDP growth 32.41 56.99 47.25 16.16 -183.27 -43.38 29.31 2.39 25.76
Chile   
GDP growth  3.69 4.60 -1.12 7.28 1.14 6.75 8.71 3.84 4.36
Capital contribution 1.31 1.18 0.86 0.29 0.69 1.06 2.16 2.63 1.27
   Share of GDP growth 35.49 25.72 76.76 4.00 60.31 15.64 24.80 68.59 29.19
Raw labor contribution 0.30 0.29 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.92 0.65 0.49 0.47
   Share of GDP growth 8.11 6.25 33.90 5.33 32.11 13.63 7.49 12.76 10.85
Human capital contribution 0.57 0.57 0.80 0.81 0.72 1.69 1.11 0.79 0.88
   Share of GDP growth 15.35 12.42 71.57 11.18 62.54 24.99 12.71 20.55 20.21
Total factor productivity 1.51 2.56 -3.17 5.79 -0.63 3.09 4.79 -0.07 1.73
    Share of GDP growth 41.04 55.61 -282.23 79.49 -54.96 45.74 55.01 -1.89 39.75
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  (concluded)
Colombia    
GDP growth  4.65 5.88 5.67 5.38 2.25 4.95 4.14 1.12 4.25
Capital contribution 2.07 1.58 1.98 1.95 2.28 1.86 1.94 1.36 1.88
   Share of GDP growth 44.59 26.91 34.94 36.21 101.23 37.52 46.85 121.51 44.11
Raw labor contribution 0.50 0.50 0.64 0.69 0.42 0.58 0.41 0.16 0.49
   Share of GDP growth 10.79 8.47 11.22 12.73 18.64 11.76 9.85 14.17 11.42
Human capital contribution 1.13 1.31 1.60 1.46 0.81 0.98 0.62 0.31 1.03
   Share of GDP growth 24.31 22.30 28.23 27.09 35.84 19.79 14.94 27.33 24.12
Total factor productivity 0.94 2.49 1.45 1.29 -1.25 1.53 1.17 -0.70 0.87
   Share of GDP growth 20.30 42.32 25.62 23.97 -55.71 30.94 28.36 -63.01 20.35
     
Mexico    
GDP growth  7.25 6.26 6.27 7.14 2.03 1.72 1.61 3.96 4.53
Capital contribution 4.05 4.33 3.67 3.09 3.11 1.69 2.57 2.11 3.08
   Share of GDP growth 55.91 69.14 58.55 43.27 153.01 98.12 159.59 53.35 67.94
Raw labor contribution 0.47 0.46 0.68 0.71 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.72 0.56
   Share of GDP growth 6.54 7.33 10.83 9.91 23.09 27.69 31.26 18.28 12.40
Human capital contribution 0.79 0.86 1.43 1.53 0.78 0.51 0.40 0.65 0.87
   Share of GDP growth 10.86 13.82 22.76 21.36 38.43 29.59 24.64 16.46 19.16
Total factor productivity 1.93 0.61 0.49 1.82 -2.33 -0.95 -1.86 0.47 0.02
   Share of GDP growth 26.69 9.72 7.85 25.46 -114.54 -55.39 -115.49 11.91 0.51
          
Venezuela         
GDP growth  6.18 4.02 2.97 2.54 -0.91 2.76 3.53 -0.37 2.59
Capital contribution 1.80 2.09 2.12 3.68 1.36 0.76 0.94 0.62 1.67
   Share of GDP growth 29.19 51.91 71.53 145.21 149.29 27.52 26.48 166.24 64.54
Raw labor contribution 0.62 0.62 0.89 0.95 0.48 0.48 0.72 0.48 0.66
   Share of GDP growth 10.03 15.51 30.14 37.39 53.15 17.48 20.38 128.23 25.34
Human capital contribution 1.91 1.72 2.08 1.79 0.76 0.63 0.81 0.56 1.28
   Share of GDP growth 30.90 42.85 69.95 70.45 83.75 22.94 22.80 149.92 49.49
Total factor productivity 1.85 -0.41 -2.13 -3.88 -3.52 0.89 1.07 -2.02 -1.02
   Share of GDP growth 29.88 -10.27 -71.62 -153.05 -386.19 32.07 30.34 -544.39 -39.37
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank and United Nations Statistical Office. 
a Capital stock series generated using the series of gross capital formation at constant prices but unadjusted by rates of 
“utilization” of capital. The wage bill is decomposed between the raw labor and quality (or human capital) components. 
Based on GDP and gross fixed capital formation at constant prices in local currency.  
 
Table 1b 
EXTENDED GROWTH ACCOUNTING APPROACH (EA) a 
Country 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-02 1961-02
Argentina          
GDP growth  3.99 4.02 3.12 2.96 -2.43 -0.33 6.70 -0.28 2.22
Capital contribution 2.47 1.50 2.19 3.47 -0.31 -0.33 1.80 0.41 1.40
   Share of GDP growth 61.86 37.34 70.28 117.26 -12.74 -99.91 26.84 142.73 63.09
Raw labor contribution 0.39 0.39 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.28 0.20
   Share of GDP growth 9.66 9.64 7.79 7.98 2.43 13.43 -0.97 96.85 8.83
Human capital contribution 0.44 0.50 0.30 0.25 0.05 0.04 -0.09 0.25 0.22
   Share of GDP growth 10.96 12.56 9.75 8.41 1.94 12.22 -1.33 87.15 9.82
Total factor productivity 0.70 1.62 0.38 -0.99 -2.23 -0.09 5.06 -1.21 0.41
   Share of GDP growth 17.52 40.45 12.19 -33.65 -91.63 -25.74 75.45 -426.73 18.27
Brazil          
GDP growth  4.58 7.80 10.32 6.70 1.20 2.09 3.16 2.03 4.73
Capital contribution 0.93 1.37 3.31 4.03 1.37 1.81 1.40 1.37 1.95
   Share of GDP growth 20.29 17.59 32.14 60.10 114.63 86.35 44.30 67.46 41.17
Raw labor contribution 0.52 0.52 0.82 0.88 0.64 0.66 0.61 0.47 0.64
   Share of GDP growth 11.44 6.63 7.92 13.06 53.49 31.74 19.23 23.00 13.50
Human capital contribution 1.56 1.38 1.62 1.52 1.04 1.03 0.91 0.66 1.21
   Share of GDP growth 33.95 17.67 15.73 22.71 86.37 49.21 28.78 32.32 25.63
Total factor productivity 1.57 4.53 4.56 0.28 -1.85 -1.41 0.24 -0.46 0.93
   Share of GDP growth 34.33 58.10 44.22 4.13 -154.49 -67.30 7.69 -22.77 19.70
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Chile          
GDP growth  3.69 4.60 -1.12 7.28 1.14 6.75 8.71 3.84 4.36
Capital contribution 1.13 1.75 0.62 2.52 0.08 1.57 2.78 2.82 1.66
   Share of GDP growth 30.62 38.01 55.07 34.57 6.77 23.21 31.89 73.54 38.00
Raw labor contribution 0.30 0.29 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.92 0.65 0.49 0.47
   Share of GDP growth 8.11 6.25 33.90 5.33 32.11 13.63 7.49 12.76 10.85
Human capital contribution 0.57 0.57 0.80 0.81 0.72 1.69 1.11 0.79 0.88
   Share of GDP growth 15.35 12.42 71.57 11.18 62.54 24.99 12.71 20.55 20.21
Total factor productivity 1.69 1.99 -2.92 3.56 -0.02 2.58 4.18 -0.26 1.35
   Share of GDP growth 45.91 43.32 -260.53 48.92 -1.42 38.17 47.92 -6.84 30.94
   
Colombia          
GDP growth  4.65 5.88 5.67 5.38 2.25 4.95 4.14 1.12 4.25
Capital contribution 1.85 1.64 1.61 1.99 1.76 2.30 2.32 1.66 1.89
   Share of GDP growth 39.79 27.93 28.44 36.99 78.20 46.60 55.97 148.85 44.48
Raw labor contribution 0.50 0.50 0.64 0.69 0.42 0.58 0.41 0.16 0.49
   Share of GDP growth 10.79 8.47 11.22 12.73 18.64 11.76 9.85 14.17 11.42
Human capital contribution 1.13 1.31 1.60 1.46 0.81 0.98 0.62 0.31 1.03
   Share of GDP growth 24.31 22.30 28.23 27.09 35.84 19.79 14.94 27.33 24.12
Total factor productivity 1.17 2.43 1.82 1.25 -0.73 1.08 0.80 -1.01 0.85
   Share of GDP growth 25.11 41.30 32.11 23.19 -32.69 21.85 19.24 -90.35 19.98
          
Mexico          
GDP growth  7.25 6.26 6.27 7.14 2.03 1.72 1.61 3.96 4.53
Capital contribution 3.94 4.08 3.56 3.57 3.25 1.86 1.58 3.27 3.14
   Share of GDP growth 54.41 65.21 56.76 50.02 160.09 108.19 98.22 82.53 69.31
Raw labor contribution 0.47 0.46 0.68 0.71 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.72 0.56
   Share of GDP growth 6.54 7.33 10.83 9.91 23.09 27.69 31.26 18.28 12.40
Human capital contribution 0.79 0.86 1.43 1.53 0.78 0.51 0.40 0.65 0.87
   Share of GDP growth 10.86 13.82 22.76 21.36 38.43 29.59 24.64 16.46 19.16
Total factor productivity 2.04 0.85 0.61 1.34 -2.47 -1.13 -0.87 -0.68 -0.04
   Share of GDP growth 28.19 13.65 9.65 18.71 -121.61 -65.46 -54.12 -17.27 -0.86
          
Venezuela          
GDP growth  6.18 4.02 2.97 2.54 -0.91 2.76 3.53 -0.37 2.59
Capital contribution 2.29 2.61 2.14 4.17 0.57 0.84 1.39 0.23 1.78
   Share of GDP growth 37.05 65.04 72.05 164.18 62.82 30.47 39.43 62.95 68.78
Raw labor contribution 0.62 0.62 0.89 0.95 0.48 0.48 0.72 0.48 0.66
   Share of GDP growth 10.03 15.51 30.14 37.39 53.15 17.48 20.38 128.23 25.34
Human capital contribution 1.91 1.72 2.08 1.79 0.76 0.63 0.81 0.56 1.28
   Share of GDP growth 30.90 42.85 69.95 70.45 83.75 22.94 22.80 149.92 49.49
Total factor productivity 1.36 -0.94 -2.14 -4.37 -2.73 0.80 0.61 -1.64 -1.13
   Share of GDP growth 22.01 -23.40 -72.14 -172.02 -299.71 29.12 17.39 -441.11 -43.61
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank and United Nations Statistical Office. 
a Capital stock series adjusted by rates of “utilization” of capital and using the series of gross capital formation at current 
prices to generate the capital stock series (deflated by the DDP deflator). The wage bill is decomposed between the raw 
labor and quality (or human capital) components. Based on GDP at constant prices local currency and gross fixed 
capital formation at current prices in local currency. Source: WDI, World Bank; United Nations Statistical Office. 
 
 
Looking at the results from tables 1a and 1b, we observe that physical capital appears at first 
sight to be the leading source of growth for all six countries in the whole 1960-2002 period. Its 
impact, in terms of average shares of capital contribution on GDP growth, has varied across time 
and countries, however (see figures 2 a through l). Further examinations of the growth process leads 
to the conclusion that other growth sources, and in particular, total factor productivity, have marked 
the difference between faster and slower growth episodes. 
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Figure 2 
SOURCE OF GROWTH FOR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: TMA (LEFT) AND EA (RIGHT) 
(Index 1960=100) 
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(concluded) 
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Observation 1: Physical capital has played an important role in the growth process, but the 
other growth sources have made the difference between better and worse growth experiences. 
Physical capital contributed with about 60%-70% to accumulated GDP growth during 1960-
2002 in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela (one FGC and two SLCs). Growth performances did not 
have direct association to the physical capital contributions however. High capital contributions were 
associated with both high and low growth performances across countries and sub-periods. Despite 
having similar average shares of physical capital contribution on real GDP growth we observe that 
Mexico grew at an average rate about double the rates of Argentina and Venezuela on average during 
the whole 1960-2002 period (4.5% compared to 2.2% and 2.6%, respectively). In the case of the three 
other FGCs (Brazil, Chile, Colombia), real GDP growth was less dependent on physical capital. The 
shares of physical capital contributions on GDP growth fluctuated between 30% and 45% for these 
countries, about half the shares of the more capital-dependent growth countries. 
Some key remarks emerged observing the differential performance of the FGCs compared to 
the SLCs in terms of the shares of the physical capital contributions on real GDP growth during 
1960-2002. 
Among the FGCs countries, Brazil was the leader in terms of average real GDP growth 
considering the whole 1960-2002 period (although after the 1980s its performance fell sharply). 
Brazil is followed by Mexico, Chile and Colombia in terms of average GDP growth during the 
whole 1960-2002 period. In the cases of Brazil and Mexico, the shares of physical capital 
contributions on real GDP growth exhibited a rising trend through the different sub-periods, 
reaching a peak in 1981-85 for Brazil and 1991-95 for Mexico (and declined thereafter). Real GDP 
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growth reached the lowest average rates in those sub-periods, however. These observations hold 
under the TMA and the EA. Under the EA, however, Mexico reached the peak in terms of the share 
of physical capital contribution on GDP growth in 1981-85 (160%), when the average real GDP 
growth was the third lowest of all sub-periods (2%). 
In the cases of Chile and Colombia (the countries with the lowest average shares of physical 
capital contributions on real GDP growth) the physical capital contributions increased through the 
1990s and early 2000s, but as in the other two FGCs there was a positive relationship between 
growth and capital contribution. Chile reached the highest share of physical capital contribution on 
growth in 1971-75 (69%) with the TMA and 1996-2002 (74%) with the EA, but average real GDP 
growth was negative in 1971-75. During 1996-2002, average real GDP growth was less than half 
the average rate in the peak years (1991-1995) but with a share of capital contribution on real GDP 
growth of near three times higher. Colombia reached the lowest average GDP growth in 1996-2002 
when the capital contribution (as a share of GDP growth) was at the peak (122% with TMA and 
149% with EA). Meanwhile, in the best growth years (5.9 % real GDP growth in 1966-70) the share 
of capital contribution on growth was the lowest of all sub-periods (about 28%). 
In three of the four FGCs (Brazil, Chile, and Colombia), in the best growth years, total factor 
productivity was the leading source of growth, followed by physical capital or human capital, 
depending on the sub-period. Mexico, is the exception of the FGCs showing physical capital 
contributions as the main force of growth in the best growth years. However, as we indicated above, 
we also observe that the years Mexico had the highest physical capital contributions (as shares of 
GDP growth) are also the years of the lowest average GDP growth.  
In the case of the SGCs the highest shares of contributions on real GDP growth coincides 
with the years of negative or low growth while the best growth years also coincides with the lowest 
shares of capital contributions on growth. 
Observation 2: Labor has played a mixed role in the growth process, helping to push growth 
in the fastest growth countries (FGCs) but not in the slowest growth countries (SGCs). The role of 
the human capital component has been more important than the raw labor component. 
The role of labor as a source of growth has been mixed but did not mark the difference 
between high growth and low growth experiences. The role of labor has been driven mostly by the 
human capital component, with raw labor playing a secondary role. We also observe that the share 
of the labor contribution on growth has been above the shares of the physical capital contribution on 
growth on many occasions across time and countries.  
In the case of Brazil, the role of labor as a source of growth has been above the role of physical 
capital in all the sub-periods shown in tables 1a and 1b. Venezuela is at the top of the performers in 
terms of direct contributions from raw and human capital, but ranks at the bottom of the growth 
performers, however. As for the case of physical capital, the effectiveness of labor in stimulating 
growth appears to have depended on additional factors, which are being measured as total factor 
productivity (TFP). TFP has made the difference between high and low GDP growth experiences. 
Observation 3: Total Factor Productivity (TFP) was the main source that marked the 
difference between better and worse growth experiences.  
TFP was clearly the main source of growth in two of the FGC group, Brazil in the mid-1960s 
through the mid-1970s and Chile between the second half of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. 
Colombia also experienced high contributions from TFP as a share of GDP growth, though they 
declined in the second half of the 1980s and second half of the 1990s. Mexico appears as the exception 
in the FGC group, with shares of contributions from TFP on growth below the shares of the 
contributions from physical capital. For the whole set of six countries we observe that while record 
high contributions from physical capital have co-existed with negative or low GDP growth. In all four 
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of the FGCs the shares of TFP on growth was the highest in the best and worse growth years, and 
above the shares of the contributions from the other growth sources (tables 1a and 1b, and figures 2c 
through 2j). 
In the case of the SGCs the leading role of TFP is also evident. TFP has marked the 
difference between the high and low real GDP growth years. Argentina experienced a modest jump 
in TFP growth in the early 1990s, which was being reversed since 1997 in tandem with a declining 
trend of GDP growth. The case of Venezuela is even worse, the contribution from TFP never took 
off and it has been declining since the early 1970s. The poor growth performance of Venezuela has 
been only partly attenuated by the positive direct contributions from human capital. 
Additional evidence of the key role played by TFP in the growth process of Latin America is 
obtained from the exercises summarized in tables 2a (for TMA) and 2b (for EA). We selected from the 
panel of all annual growth rates (across countries and years) the best ten and the worst ten growth rates 
in each of the following four decades: 1961-70, 1971-80, 1981-90, and 1991-2002. In tables 2a and 2b 
we show the means and medians for the average growth rates, average physical capital contributions, 
and average TFP contributions. We also show the difference in the means and medians between the 
ten highest and ten lowest growth events Last two rows) and the ratios of the differences in the means 
and medians between the average the contributions physical capital and real GDP growth and between 
the contribution from TFP and real GDP growth. These last columns show the relative incidences of 
physical capital and TFP in marking the difference between the ten highest and the ten lowest growth 
episodes. 
Table 2a 
HIGHS AND LOWS REAL GDP GROWTH RATES: DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS  
FROM TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (TMA) 
 GDP growth TFP contribution  Ratio of differences 
 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02  1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02
10 highest               
GDP growth rates        
Mean 10.43 10.34 7.87 9.51 5.11 4.81 4.96 6.26      
Median 10.20 9.74 7.91 8.93 4.99 4.09 4.94 5.42      
               
10 lowest                
GDP growth rates        
Mean 0.45 -2.44 -6.13 -5.04 -2.95 -4.87 -8.38 -6.18      
Median 0.79 -1.42 -5.32 -4.31 -2.65 -5.37 -8.31 -5.64      
        
Difference in Means 9.97 12.78 14.00 14.55 8.07 9.69 13.33 12.44  0.81 0.76 0.95 0.86
Difference in Medians 9.41 11.16 13.23 13.23 7.64 9.45 13.24 11.06  0.81 0.85 1.00 0.84
      
 GDP growth Capital contribution  Ratio of differences 
 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02  1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02
10 highest               
GDP growth rates        
Mean 10.43 10.34 7.87 9.51 1.98 2.85 0.99 1.57      
Median 10.20 9.74 7.91 8.93 1.55 2.84 0.82 1.76      
               
10 lowest                
GDP growth rates        
Mean 0.45 -2.44 -6.13 -5.04 1.84 2.04 1.61 1.57      
Median 0.79 -1.42 -5.32 -4.31 1.95 1.89 1.36 1.55      
        
Difference in Means 9.97 12.78 14.00 14.55 0.14 0.81 -0.62 0.00  0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.00
Difference in Medians 9.41 11.16 13.23 13.23 -0.40 0.95 -0.54 0.21  -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.02
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank and United Nations Statistical Office. 
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Table 2b 
HIGHS AND LOWS REAL GDP GROWTH RATES: DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS  
FROM TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY AND CAPITAL (EA) 
 GDP growth TFP contribution  Ratio of differences 
1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02
10 highest              
GDP growth rates      
Mean 10.43 10.34 7.87 9.51 5.20 4.46 2.94 4.73      
Median 10.20 9.74 8.93 5.26 4.41 2.41 4.54      
              
10 lowest               
GDP growth rates        
Mean 0.45 -2.44 -6.13 -5.04 -1.74 -4.71 -4.45      
Median 0.79 -1.42 -5.32 -4.31 -1.45 -4.26 -3.33      
         
Difference in Means 9.97 12.78 14.55 6.94 9.16 7.39 7.12 0.70 0.72 0.53 0.49











 GDP growth Capital contribution  Ratio of differences 
1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02 1961-70 1971-80 1991-02 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-02
10 highest               
GDP growth rates      
Mean 10.43 10.34 7.87 9.51 3.78 4.56 3.01 3.78      
Median 10.20 9.74 7.91 8.93 3.92 4.46 2.90 3.75      
               
10 lowest                
GDP growth rates         
Mean 0.45 -2.44 -6.13 -5.04 0.54 0.86 -2.31 -2.22      
Median 0.79 -1.42 -5.32 -4.31 1.28 1.11 -2.42 -1.99      
         
Difference in Means 9.97 12.78 14.00 14.55 3.24 3.69 5.33 6.00 0.33 0.29 0.38 0.41
Difference in Medians 9.41 11.16 13.23 13.23 2.64 3.35 5.32 5.74 0.28 0.30 0.40 0.43
1981-90
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank and United Nations Statistical Office. 
 
The exercise provides crucial evidence about the leading role of TFP. The results in the last 
columns of tables 2a and 2b show that capital TFP explains between 76% and 95% of the 
differences in the means in the case of the TMA and between 49% and 70% in the case of the EA. 
Using the medians, TFP explains between 81% and 100% of the GDP growth differences with the 
TMA and between 50% and 79% in the case of the EA.  
Similar calculations are shown for physical capital in the lowest parts of tables 2a and 2b. 
The ratios of the differences of medians and means are below 8 percent and in some cases negative! 
in the case of TMA, and between 28% and 43% in the case of the EA, clearly much below the 
incidences of the TFPs. 
Similar evidence about the primary role played by TFP in explaining fast growth episodes 
have been provided in recent research on economic growth such as Easterly (2001) and Easterly and 
Levine (2001) in a global analysis; Easterly and Pack (2001) for Africa; Elias (1990 and 1992) for 
Latin America; Harberger (1996 and 1998) for East Asia, Latin America, ad the United States and 
Mexican manufacturing sectors; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clarke (1997b) in a global analysis; 
Loayza et.al. (2004) for Latin America; and Fajnzylber and Lederman (1999) for Latin America. In 
a most recent study, Solimano and Soto (2004) also showed for a sample of 12 Latin American 
countries for the period 1960-2000 that TFP was the main determinant of GDP growth.8 
                                                     
8  Solimano and Soto (2004) concluded that most of the evolution of GDP growth is the result of changes in the efficiency and rate of 
utilization in the use of capital and labor (TFP). 
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Despite the modifications and extensions we introduced to the traditional growth accounting 
methodology the main conclusion prevails in favor of the leading role played by TFP and not 
physical capital in “explaining” the difference between fast and slow growth experiences in Latin 
America. Argentina and Venezuela have performed at the bottom of the six largest Latin American, 
taking the whole 1960-2002 period, with modest TFP growth being a main feature of their poor 
growth performance. At the other extreme, Chile has experienced the fastest GDP growth on 
average since the 1980s, despite some weakened strength after the mid-1990s (Figure 2e and 2f), 
and mostly driven by total factor productivity growth. It is interesting to observe in the Chilean case 
that the EA assigns a lower role to TFP compared to physical capital, which in large part reflects the 
incidence of TFP on the return of physical capital.9 
In the next section we examine how the composition of investment and other key factors have 
contributed to economic growth. We use per capita GDP growth as a proxy for aggregate for labor 
productivity growth. 
 
                                                     
9  From the EA growth accounting calculations, the implicit net returns to physical capital in Chile rose from about 10% annual rate in the 
early 1980s to about 15% by the mid-1990s. From the mid-1990s onward, the rate declined to slightly below 10% by 2002, reflecting the 
negative TFP trend that developed after the mid-1990s.  
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II. Composition of investment 
between machinery and 
equipment and construction 
structures 
In the previous section we provided evidence showing that 
physical capital played an important role in the process of economic 
growth in Latin America during 1960-2002, but that it was not the 
main factor that explained the difference between fast and slow growth 
experiences. We showed evidence that total factor productivity was the 
key force making the difference. In this section we will explore in 
more detail the additional ingredients that contributed to GDP growth 
in Latin America during 1960-2002. We use regression analysis and 
examine the effects on per capita GDP growth of fixed investment by 
type of assets and policy related variables. We use GDP per capita 
growth as a proxy for labor productivity growth. This approach has 
been followed in seminal endogenous growth estimates. See for 
example Barro and Lee (1994), De Long and Summers (1991 and 
1993), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clarke (1997b), and Loayza et. al 
(2004).10 In this section we examine the composition of fixed 
investment between machinery and equipment and construction 
structures. In the next section we analyze the composition of fixed 
investment between private and public investment.  
                                                     
10  Solimano and Soto (1994) use the growth rates of TFPs (computed through growth accounting) for a panel of 12 Latin American countries 
for the period 1960-2002 as the dependent variable instead of per capita GDP growth. They showed evidence, however, of a “striking 
similarity” between changes of total factor productivity and per capita or per working age GDP. Both approaches should yield similar 
results as long as the regression estimates takes account of fixed investment as an additional control variable.  
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Some quantitative studies have emphasized the role of machinery investment in augmenting 
the role of physical capital and labor in the growth processes. Since the industrial revolution 
machinery investment has played a key role, directly as a production factor, and also as a mean of 
acquisition and transmission of technological improvements across countries and within countries. 
De Long and Summers (1991 and 1993) found evidence of high social returns from investments in 
machinery, assigning to machinery investment a primary role in boosting productivity growth 
(proxied by per capita GDP). They showed that high rates of machinery investment accounted for 
most of Japan’s successful growth experience after World War II. They concluded that fast-growing 
countries were those with favorable supply conditions for machinery investments and that 
developing countries benefited as much as richer economies from the technologies embodied in 
machinery. Building projects are usually less effective in promoting growth because the 
technologies embodied in constructions structures have lower potential of being transmitted across 
production process. In addition, the output of the construction sector is mostly non-tradable and 
technologically less dynamic. 
The structure of investment by type of assets matters for economic growth because the different 
technologies embodied in different types of investment assets are have different effects on productivity 
and growth. Economic policies also play a main role in affecting economy wide productivity and 
economic growth as they se the framework for the allocation and use of production factors and 
decision making by economic agents. The contributions of physical capital and labor to economic 
growth depend on the quality of the economic framework. Price stability has become an important 
factor adding to growth because of irreversible characteristics of investment makes investment 
decisions highly sensitive to factor affecting inflation prospects and associated uncertainty about the 
evolution of relative prices (see Pyndick and Solimano, 1993). The size of the government also has 
been shown to matter for growth because an increase of fiscal vulnerability affects economic prospects 
and economic stability, and because public spending could be crowding out private saving and 
investment. Economic instability and uncertainty about economic prospects have been shown to be 
main factors that have contributed to discourage investment. Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven, and Solimano 
(1996) concluded in a review of the literature that investment is necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for growth and that human capital, technological innovation, and appropriate policies are 
also necessary for sustained high growth. Evidence about the role of education as a factor contributing 
to growth has also been provided in other seminal studies (for example: Barro and Lee, 1994). 
Education facilitates the adoption of modern technologies embodied in new machinery and equipment 
and creates positive externalities (Lucas, 1988).  
In tables 3a and 3b we provide evidence about the impact of total fixed investment, and its 
composition between machinery and equipment, and construction structures on per capita GDP 
growth. We included regression estimates for aggregate fixed investment to enrich the conclusions 
reached in Section I. We tested the impact on per capita GDP growth of fixed investment and its 
composition by type of assets combined with some key policy variables (including education). We 
tried with a selected number of variables that are related to economic policy making: (1) inflation 
(annual % change in the consumer price index), a measure of the degree of price stability and also 
related to consistency of macroeconomic policies; (2) trade openness (% share of trade in GDP), 
related to the degree of trade protection; (3) government consumption (% of GDP), related to 
policies that assign different roles to the size of the government sector in the economy; (4) external 
debt (% of GDP), related to macroeconomic policies that have conducted to different degrees of 
external debt exposures; (5) foreign direct investment (FDI) (% of GDP), related to policies that 
affect the degree capital openness and regulations affecting FDI; (6) infrastructure (per capita 
telephone lines), related to policies that have assigned different priorities to the development of 
infrastructure; and (7) education (ratio of gross secondary enrollment to the population of the same 
age group), related to education policies and the priorities assigned to the extension of education. 
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We call these variables policy related variables because they reflect or are the result of economic 
policies.11 
We also included initial per capita GDP (values at initial year of each sub-period) to account 
for conditional convergence, which has been reported as important in other growth studies (see for 
example Barro and Lee, 1994; and Loayza et.al., 2004 among others). We used panel data for the 
six Latin American countries for the period 1960-2002 and used, for the estimates shown in table 
3a, 5-year averages to reduce the effect of short-term fluctuations (we obtained 48 0bservations). 
We run panel regressions using OLS with country fixed effects and corrected for heterocedasticity 
as needed.12 We use national accounts data at constant prices in local currency and variables 
expressed as shares of GDP. Appendix A contains a detailed reference to the sources and 
description of the variables used. 
For the estimates shown in table 3b we used annual date to obtain estimates for the whole 
period (258 observations), but we broke also the whole period into several sub-periods in order to 
appreciate the stability of the coefficients derived from the whole period (long-run) estimates. The 
structural analysis allowed us to appreciate changes in the relevance of the explanatory variables 
through the different sub-periods considered. In table 3b we include the results from computing 
structural break tests (Chow test) for three types of breaks: (1) 1960-80/1981-1990/1991-2002; (2) 
1960-80/1981-2002; and (3) 1986-90/1991-2002.  
Three main sub-periods fall within the whole 42 years: (1) 1960-80: representing the gradual 
agony of the old import substitution industrialization strategy; (2) 1980-1990: the debt crisis, 
economic instability and beginning of the stabilization and reforms conducting to put in place a new 
outward looking and export led development strategy; and (3) 1990-2002: gradual consolidation of 
the outward approach. In table 3b we show in the first columns the same type of equations shown in 
table 3a (estimated on the base of 5-year averages and in the second column the estimates using 
annual data. In the rest of the columns we compute the annual equations for the breaks used to 
compute the Chow tests (whose results are shown in the last rows under the annual equation 
estimates for the whole period of each equations group). We used annual estimates to compute the 
structural break tests in order to have an appropriate number of degrees of freedom to assess the 
structural changes.  
The results of the annual estimates for the whole 1960-2002 period confirm in general the 
results obtained using 5-year averages, which helps to reinforce the long-run trends (see the first 
two columns for each set of equations in table 3b). The observations stated below (Observations 4 
trough 6) are based on the results shown in table 3a. We consider them as the benchmark long-rung 
estimates and trends. Among the policy related variables, FDI and infrastructure showed 
significance in the annual estimate for the whole period but did not include them in our general 
long-run observations as their significance disappears in the equations using 5-year averages, which 
we consider to be the benchmark for the long-run observations.13 Due qualifications to each of the 
long-run observations and trends are drawn from the results of the structural analysis, however. 
                                                     
11  High inflation episodes have been generally associated with more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. A high share of government 
consumption in GDP has reflected fiscal policies that have assigned the government a more predominant role in the growth process. A 
higher share of trade in GDP reflects commercial policies that have reduced trade barriers. Higher shares of FDI in GDP and of 
infrastructure are reflecting policies that have deregulated FDI and have been more aggressive in the privatization processes (including 
concessions). And, changes in the coverage of secondary enrollment reflect the strength of educational policies, although as we mention in 
the text, existing education variables are imperfect measures of human capital formation. Measures of education levels do not account for 
quality or for on-the- job training factors.  
12  We applied the White’s diagonal method that proves to be robust to observation specific heterocedasticity in the residuals. 
13  These observations are representative for the six countries as a whole, however. The debt crisis events of Argentina, Ecuador, and 
Uruguay in the 2000s (and from which Brazil was close in 1999) are indicative that policy disparities across countries continued after the 
1980s making some countries more sensible than others to the different factors affecting growth. 
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Table 3a 
GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH DETERMINANT: TOTAL INVESTMENT, MACHINERY  
AND EQUIPMENT, AND CONSTRUCTION STRUCTURES 
Pool OLS estimates for growth of real GDP per capita (lnyt-lnyt-1) 
Sample: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela 
Five-year averages: 1960-2002. Number of observations: 48 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Investment rate (% GDP) 0.0046*** 0.0037** 0.004*** 0.0035***   
 (2.70) (2.43) (3.10) (2.69)   
Mach & Equip Rate (% GDP)      0.0074*** 0.0071*** 
     (3.66) (3.65) 
Constructions rate (% GDP)       
       
Inflation (annual %)   -0.00003* -0.00005**   
   (-1.83) (-2.52)   
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)    0.0007    
   (1.63)    
Government consumption (% GDP)   -0.0034*** -0.003**   
   (-3.05) (-2.50)   
External debt  (% GDP)   -0.0005*    
   (-1.83)    
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)   -0.0037    
   (-0.95)    
Infrastr. (ln telephone lines per capita)   0.0217    
   (1.43)    
Education (ln ratio second. enroll.)   0.0007* 0.0008***   
   (1.72) (3.01)   
Population growth (%) -0.0129    -0.0046  
 (-1.18)    (-0.51)  
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the  -0.06*** -0.041*** -0.1331*** -0.0671*** -48*** -0.042*** 
beginning of each sub-period) (-3.02)  (-3.86)  (-4.19)  (-3.62)  (-2.89)  (-4.29)   
R sq 0.41 0.38 0.78 0.57 0.43 0.43
F stat 3.32 3.45 5.37 4.98 3.75 4.29
 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Investment rate (% GDP)       
           
Mach & Equip Rate (% GDP)  0.0072*** 0.0069*** 0.0064*** 0.0052 *** 0.0057*** 
 (3.46) (3.44) (3.53) (2.80)  (3.19) 
Constructions rate (% GDP) 0.0022 0.0013 0.0008    
 (1.03) (0.68) (0.40)    
Inflation (annual %)   -0.00005** -0.00004  -0.00006*** 
   (2.50) (-2.38)  (-3.17) 
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)     0.0006   
    (1.20)   
Government consumption (% GDP)    -0.0022 ** -0.0022** 
    (-1.75)  (-1.70) 
External debt  (% GDP)    -0.0005*   
    (-1.85)   
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)    -0.0002   
    (-0.04)   
Infrastr. (ln telephone lines per capita)    0.0146   
    (1.06)   
Education (ln ratio second. enroll.)   0.0004* 0.0003  0.0004* 
   (1.67) (0.71)  (1.76) 
Population growth (%) -0.0097         
 (-0.87)      
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the  -0.058*** -0.043*** -0.0606*** -0.1052 *** -0.0505*** 
beginning of each sub-period) (-2.88)  (-4.53)  (-3.23)  (-3.83)   (-2.93)  
R sq 0.45 0.44 0.55 0.76  0.58 
F stat 3.51 3.8 4.54 4.78  5.15 
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank and United Nations Statistical Office. 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis; Asterisks mean: statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% 
level (***). Fixed effects; Corrected for Heterocedasticity. 
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Table 3b 
GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH DETERMINANT: TOTAL FIXED INVESTMENT, MACHINERY  
AND EQUIPMENT, AND CONSTRUCTIONS 
Sample: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela 
1960-2002 (annual data: 258 observations; 5-year averages: 48 observations) 
 (1) (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) 
 1960-2002 1960-2002 1960-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 1960-1990 
 5-year averages annual annual annual annual annual 
Investment rate (% GDP) 0.0046*** 0.0048*** 0.0032*** 0.0083** 0.0052** 0.0044***
 (2.70)  (4.76) (2.46) (2.37) (2.44) (3.92)  
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP)       
   
Constructions rate  (% GDP)       
   
Inflation (annual %)       
   
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)       
   
Government consumption(% GDP)       
   
External debt (% GDP)       
   
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)       
   
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per
capita)       
   
Education (ln ratio second. enroll)       
   
Population growth (%) -0.0129 -0.0088 -0.0379** -0.0195 -0.0334 -0.0078 
 (-1.18)  (-1.27) (-2.12) (-0.46) (-0.64) (-0.81)  
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the  -0.06*** -0.0586*** -0.0609** -0.392*** -0.2536*** -0.0659***
beginning of each sub-period) (-3.02)   (-3.93)  (-2.17)  (-3.09)  (-3.74)  (-3.32)   
R sq 0.41 0.2 0.19 0.32 0.43 0.2 
F stat 3.32 7.81 3.33 3.07 6.04 5.39 
Chow tests:       
1960-80/ 1981-90/1991-2002  20.97     
1960-80/1981-2002  14.09     
1960-90/1991-2002  2.32     
 
 (2) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) 
 1960-2002 1960-2002 1960-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 1960-1990 
 5-year averages annual annual annual annual annual 
Investment rate (% GDP) 0.0037** 0.0043*** 0.0023* 0.0080** 0.0046 ** 0.0041***
 (2.43) (4.78) (1.85) (2.39) (2.37)  (3.94) 
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP)        
Constructions rate  (% GDP)        
    
Inflation (annual %)        
    
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)        
Government consumption(% GDP)        
    
External debt (% GDP)        
    
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)        
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per
capita)        
    
Education (ln ratio second. enroll)        
    
Population growth (%)        
    
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the  -0.041*** -0.0457*** -0.0179 -0.3930 -0.2231 *** -0.056***
beginning of each sub-period) (-3.86)  (-5.29)  (-0.94) (-3.09)*** (-5.10)   (-4.00)  
R sq 0.38 0.19 0.15 0.32 0.42  0.19 
F stat 3.45 8.67 2.92 3.52 6.81  6.09 
Chow tests:        
1960-80/ 1981-90/1991-2002  5.74      
1960-80/1981-2002  1.19      
1960-90/1991-2002  2.68      
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 (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) (3e) 
 1960-2002 1960-2002 1960-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 1960-1990 
5-year averages annual annual annual annual annual 
 
Investment rate (% GDP) 0.004*** 0.0052*** *** 0.0097*** 0.0065*** 0.0054***
(3.10) (5.06)  (3.39)  (3.29) (3.88) 
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP) 
 
Constructions rate (% GDP)  
Inflation (annual %) -0.00003* -0.00004*** *** -0.00004*** 0.0001 -0.0005***
(-1.83) (-4.99)  (-3.90)  (0.81) (-4.38)
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP) 0.0007 0.0003 0.001 0.0016*** -0.0008
(1.63) (0.79)  (-0.86)  -3.09 (-0.96) 




      
0.0041
   (2.72)
      
      
     
       
0.0002  
 (-4.98)  
  -0.0009   
   (-0.76)
0.0026
 (-0.67) (-1.77)  (-1.15) (-2.96) 
External debt (% GDP) -0.0005* -0.0006*** -0.0015** -0.0002 -0.0011* -0.0008***
 (-1.83) (-3.28) (-2.13) (-0.59)  (-1.16) (-2.79) 
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) -0.0037 -0.0048** -0.0046 -0.0081 0.0007 -0.0076 
 (-0.95) (-2.48) (-0.87) (-1.24)  (0.22) (-1.99) 
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per 
capita) 0.0217 0.0317** 0.0572 0.117*** 0.7778 0.0443**
 (1.43) (2.54) (1.38) (2.47)  (1.51) (2.37) 
Education (ln ratio second. enroll) 0.0007* 0.0012*** 0.0026*** 0.0031 -0.0005 0.003***
 (1.72) (3.24) (3.21) (1.43)  (-1.02) (4.05) 
Population growth (%)       
       
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the   -0.1331*** -0.1823*** -01649** -0.4913*** -0.3834*** -0.2583***
beginning of each sub-period) (-4.19)  (-6.51)  (-2.48)  (-4.88)   (-4.70)  (-5.56)  
R sq 0.78 0.45 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.50 
F stat 5.37 9.96 5.91 5.13 5.49 7.98 
Chow tests:       
1960-80/ 1981-90/1991-2002  6.34     
1960-80/1981-2002  4.63     
1960-90/1991-2002  2.37     
 
 (4) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) (4e) 
 1960-2002 1960-2002 1960-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 1960-1990 
 5-year average annual annual annual annual annual 
       
Investment rate (% GDP) 0.0035*** 0.0046*** 0.0017* 0.0084*** 0.0066*** 0.0038***
 (2.69) (4.90) (1.66) (3.16) (3.72) (3.61) 
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP)       
       
Constructions rate (% GDP)       
       
Inflation (annual %) -0.00005** -0.00004*** -0.00018*** -0.00004*** 0.0002 -0.0001***
 (-2.52) (-5.72) (-4.27) (-4.53) (1.61) (-5.82) 
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)       
       
Government consumption (% GDP) -0.003** -0.00401*** -0.0048 -0.0041 -0.0007 -0.0058***
 (-2.50) (-3.84) (-1.69) (-1.26) (-0.41) (-2.96) 
External debt (% GDP)       
       
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)       
       
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per
capita)       
       
Education (ln ratio second. enroll) 0.0008*** 0.0011*** 0.0019*** 0.0054*** 0.0005 0.0013***
 (3.01) (4.44) (2.77) (3.80) (1.61) (3.57) 
Population growth (%)       
       
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the   -0.0671*** -0.0896*** -0.06342** -0.4674*** -0.2378*** -0.0994***
beginning of each sub-period) (-3.62)  (-5.11)  (-2.12)  (-4.57)  (-4.48)  (-4.25)  
R sq 0.57 0.3 0.31 0.55 0.54 0.3 
F stat 4.98 9.99 5.01 6.1 5.88 7.47 
Chow tests:       
1960-80/ 1981-90/1991-2002  7.17     
1960-80/1981-2002  2.45     
1960-90/1991-2002  1.86     
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 (5) (5a) (5b) (5c) (5d) (5e) 
 1960-2002 1960-2002 1960-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 1960-1990 
 5-year averages annual annual annual annual annual 
Investment rate (% GDP)       
       
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP) 0.0074*** 0.009*** 0.0072*** 0.0186*** 0.0089*** 0.0078***
 (3.66) (6.86) (2.82)  (4.20) (3.15) (4.37)  
Constructions rate (% GDP)       
       
Inflation (annual %)       
       
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)       
       
Government consumption (% GDP)       
       
External debt (% GDP)       
       
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)       
       
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per
capita)       
       
Education (ln ratio second. enroll)       
       
Population growth (%) -0.0046 -0.0019 -0.0288 -0.0355 -0.0006 -0.0001 
 (-0.51) (-0.31) (-1.71)  (-0.84) (-0.01) (-0.01)  
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the   -0.048*** -0.0546*** -0.0618** -0.4529*** -0.1829*** -0.0576***
beginning of each sub-period) (-2.89)  (-4.18)  (-2.32)   (-4.41)  (-2.76)  (-3.06)   
R sq 0.43 0.23 0.2 0.42 0.43 0.2 
F stat 3.75 9.19 3.51 4.78 6.04 5.35 
Chow tests:       
1960-80/ 1981-90/1991-2002  6.12     
1960-80/1981-2002  1.95     
1960-90/1991-2002  1.30     
 
 (6) (6a) (6b) (6c) (6d) (6e) 
 1960-2002 1960-2002 1960-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 1960-1990 
 5-year averages annual annual annual annual annual 
Investment rate (% GDP)       
       
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP) 0.0071*** 0.0088*** 0.0067** 0.0175*** 0.0089*** 0.0078***
 (3.65) (6.78) (2.62) (4.06) (3.10) (4.46) 
Constructions rate (% GDP)       
  
Inflation (annual %)       
       
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)       
       
Government consumption (% GDP)       
       
External debt (% GDP)       
       
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)       
       
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per
capita)       
       
Education (ln ratio second. enroll)       
       
Population growth (%)       
       
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the   -0.042*** -0.0519*** -0.0323 -0.4527*** -0.1824*** -0.0575***
beginning of each sub-period) (-4.29)  (-6.20)  (-1.60)  (-4.43)  (-3.71)  (-4.25)  
R sq 0.43 0.23 0.18 0.41 0.43 0.2 
F stat 4.29 10.52 3.44 5.31 7.01 6.15 
Chow tests:       
1960-80/ 1981-90/1991-2002  6.29     
1960-80/1981-2002  1.18     
1960-90/1991-2002  1.49     
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 (7) (7a) (7b) (7c) (7d) (7e) 
 1960-2002 1960-2002 1960-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 1960-1990 
 5-year averages annual annual annual annual annual 
Investment rate (% GDP)       
       
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP) 0.0072*** 0.0087*** 0.0064** 0.0186*** 0.0085*** 0.0067***
 (3.46) (6.69) (2.37) (4.27) (3.31) (3.69) 
Constructions rate (% GDP) 0.0022 0.0025 0.0012 0.0002 0.0066** 0.0026 
 (1.03) (1.85)*  (0.47) (0.04) (2.28) (1.46) 
Inflation (annual %)   
    
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)       
       
Government consumption (% GDP)       
       
External debt (% GDP)       
      
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)       
       
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per
capita)       
       
Education (ln ratio second. enroll)       
       
Population growth (%) -0.0097 -0.0078 -0.0322* -0.0356 -0.0337 -0.0061 
 (-0.87) (-1.11) (-1.84) (-0.83) (-0.66) (-0.62) 
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the   -0.058*** -0.0659*** -0.0645** -0.4541*** -0.2499*** -0.0663***
beginning of each sub-period) (-2.88)  (-4.54)  (-2.33)  (-3.99)  (-3.24)  (-3.33)  
 
4.16 6.49 5.13 
Chow tests:       
1960-80/ 1981-90/1991-2002  5.61     
1960-80/1981-2002  2.36     
1960-90/1991-2002  1.96     
    
   
 
R sq 0.45 0.24 0.2 0.42 0.48 0.21
F stat 3.51 8.79 3.12 
 
 (8) (8a) (8b) (8c) (8d) (8e) 
 1960-2002 1960-2002 1960-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 1960-1990 
 5-year averages annual annual annual annual annual 
Investment rate (% GDP)       
  
0.0175*** 0.0082 *** 0.0068***
 (3.44) (6.60) (2.50) (4.08) (3.08)  (3.67) 
0.0013 0.0019 -0.0007 0.00001 0.0056 **  
 (0.68) (1.57) (-0.30) (0.004) (2.21)  (1.38) 
Inflation (annual %)        
        
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)        
        
Government consumption (% GDP)        
     
External debt (% GDP)        
        
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)        
        
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per
capita)        
     
    
        
Population growth (%)       
*** ***
  
 0.48  0.21 
F stat 3.8 9.71 2.99 4.56 7.21  5.75 
Chow tests:        
5.74   
1960-80/1981-2002  1.03      
1960-90/1991-2002  1.75     
 
      
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP) 0.0069*** 0.0084*** 0.0072**
Constructions rate (% GDP) 0.0022
   
   
Education (ln ratio second. enroll)    
 
        
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the   -0.043*** -0.0545 -0.0328 -0.4528 -0.216 *** -0.0587***
beginning of each sub-period) (-4.53)  (-6.50)  (-1.62) (-3.93)  (-4.28)   (-4.29)  
R sq 0.44 0.24 0.17 0.41
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 (9) (9a) (9c) (9d) (9b) (9e) 
 1960-2002 1960-2002 1960-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 1960-1990 
 5- year averages annual annual annual annual annual 
     
 
0.0064*** 0.0078*** 0.0035 0.0164*** *** 0.0063***
 (3.53) (6.51) (1.37) (4.70) (3.21) (3.42) 
Constructions rate (% GDP) 0.0008 0.0016 0.0011 0.0009 0.0064**  0.0019 
 (0.40) (1.14) (0.51) (0.22) (2.29) (0.97) 
-0.00005** -0.00004*** -0.0002*** -0.00003*** 0.0002* 
  
       
Government consumption (% GDP)       
       
  
      
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)       
       
    
       
Education (ln ratio second. enroll) 0.0004* 0.0005 0.0011* 
(1.67) (2.34) (1.90) (3.90) (1.38) (1.57) 
Population growth (%)       
   
-0.5268 
(-5.80)  (-3.97)  
0.27 
F stat 4.54 8.98 4.51 7.51 5.83 6.3 
Chow tests:       
1960-80/ 1981-90/1991-2002  7.94      
1.72    
1960-90/1991-2002  1.52     
Investment rate (% GDP)  
      
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP) 0.0068
Inflation (annual %) -0.00004***
 (2.50) (-4.81) (-4.42) (-6.67) (1.77) (-4.40) 
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)     
External debt (% GDP)     
 
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per
capita)   
0.0053*** 0.0005 0.0007 
 
    
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the   -0.0606*** -0.0839*** -0.0507* -0.2392*** -0.089***
beginning of each sub-period) (-3.23)  (-4.61)  (-1.75)  (-3.40)  
R sq 0.55 0.28 0.29 0.6 0.54 
1960-80/1981-2002   
 
 (10d) (10e) (10) (10a) (10b) (10c) 
1960-2002 1960-1980 1991-2002 
5-year averages annual 
   
       
0.0079*** *** 0.0066***
(3.73) (2.58) (4.29)  
Constructions rate (% GDP)       
       
Inflation (annual %) -0.00004** -0.00005*** -0.0002*** -0.00004*** 0.0001 -0.00006***
 (-2.38) (-5.31)  (-4.41) (-4.65) (0.99) (-4.46)  
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP) 0.0006 0.00007 -0.0013 -0.007 -0.0016  0.0018***
(1.20) (0.15)  (-1.32) (-1.05) (2.93) (-0.81)  
Government consumption (% GDP) -0.0022** -0.0038*** -0.0032 -0.0015 -0.0023 -0.0073***
 (-1.75) (-2.98)  (-0.83) (-0.53) (-0.86) (-2.68)  
External debt (% GDP) -0.0005* -0.0007*** -0.0013* 0.003 -0.0015** -0.0008***
 (-1.85) (-3.18)  (-1.86) (0.78) (-2.20) (-2.64)  
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) -0.0002 -0.0035 -0.0064 -0.0053 0.0009 76** 
 (-0.04) (-1.77)  (-1.09) (-1.00) (0.26) (-2.04)  
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per
capita) 0.0146 0.0291** 0.0541 0.1618 0.054 0.0383** 
 (1.06) (2.40)  (1.36) (2.79) (1.07) (2.00)  
Education (ln ratio second. enroll) 0.0003 0.0008** 0.0027*** 0.0011 -0.0007 0.0024***
 (0.71) (2.29)  (3.43) (0.46) (1.54) (3.42)  
Population growth (%)       
      
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the   -0.1052*** -0.1553*** -0.1942*** -0.5677*** -0.278*** -0.2242***
beginning of each sub-period) (-3.83)  (-6.46)   (-2.84)  (-6.62)  (-3.89)  (-5.56)   
R sq 0.76 0.44 0.63 0.68 0.59 0.49 
F stat 4.78 9.7 6.37 7.06 4.72 7.76 
 
6.45   
1960-80/1981-2002  3.22     
1960-90/1991-2002  1.77     
 1960-2002 1981-1990 1960-1990 
 annual annual annual annual 
Investment rate (% GDP)    
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP) 0.0052*** 0.0100*** 0.0218 0.0086***
 (2.80) (5.71)  (5.36) 
 
 
Chow tests:      
1960-80/ 1981-90/1991-2002    
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(concluded) 
 (11) (11a) (11b) (11c) (11d) (11e) 
 1960-2002 1960-2002 1960-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002 1960-1990 
 5-year averages annual annual annual annual annual 
Investment rate (% GDP)       
       
Mach. and equipment rate (% GDP) 0.0057*** 0.0074*** 0.0046*** 0.0168*** 0.0075*** 0.0067***
 (3.19) (5.97) (5.09) (4.05)  (2.21) (3.14) 
Constructions rate (% GDP)       
  
Inflation (annual %) -0.00006*** -0.00005*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0002 -0.00005***
 (-3.17) (-6.25) (-3.87) (-4.84) (1.57) (6.81)  
Openness (exports+imports) (% GDP)       
       
Government consumption (% GDP) -0.0022* -0.0029*** -0.0055* 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0054***
 (-1.70) (-2.78) (-1.83) (0.13) (-0.37) (-2.78)  
External debt (% GDP)       
 
    
       
Infrastructure (ln telephone lines per capita)       
  
Education (ln ratio second. enroll) 0.0004* 0.0006*** 0.0019*** 0.0053*** 0.0001 0.0008**
 (1.76) (2.75) (2.71) (3.86) (0.40) (2.21)  
Population growth (%)       
       
Per capita GDP (ln of value at the   -0.0505*** -0.0677*** -0.0698** *** -0.5244*** -0.1694 -0.0758***
(-2.93)  (-4.38)  (-2.34)  (6.41)  (-3.16)  
R sq 0.58 0.3 0.32 0.6 0.49 0.3 
F stat 5.15 9.95 5.15 7.49 4.79 7.4 
Chow tests:       
1960-80/ 1981-90/1991-2002  7.16     
1960-80/1981-2002  2.15     
1960-90/1991-2002  1.36     
 
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)   
beginning of each sub-period) (-3.57)
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank and United Nations Statistical Office. 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis; Asterisks mean: statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***). 
Fixed effects; Corrected for Heterocedasticity. 
 
Observation 4: Key factors affecting per capita GDP growth have been: (1) investment; (2) 
inflation performance; (2) the size of the government; (3) the size of the external debt; and (4) 
education. 
Confirming the findings of Section I we found that: (1) investment showed to be an important 
ingredient in the growth processes of Latin America during 1960-2002; (2) some key policy 
variables appeared also as main factors explaining per capita GDP growth during 1960-2002, and 
contributing to make the difference between fast and slow growth experiences; and (3) the 
incidence of investment and the related policy variables varied through the whole period but the 
long-run observations appear to hold.  
Columns 1 through 4 of table 3a show the regression results for total fixed investment. We 
present the best four regressions after experiencing with several combinations of dependent 
variables.14 From the results it seems clear the importance of fixed investment as a determinant of per 
capita GDP growth but other key policy related variables shoed to be also relevant in explaining per 
capita GDP growth. In addition to fixed investment, we found that key determinants of per capita GDP 
growth in Latin America during 1960-2002 were inflation, the size of government consumption, the 
size of the external debt in terms of GDP, and education (proxied by the ratio of secondary 
enrollments). We found that in the long-run (taking the whole 1960-2002 period), the most 
                                                     
14  We also examined some additional variables such as the fiscal balance (% of GDP) and the current account balance (% of GDP) but the 
series were short, truncated, or of questionable reliability. We also, examined more disaggregated fixed investment data from the Penn 
World table 5.6, but the series were also truncated and we could not obtain reliable documentation explaining the data sources. National 
accounts data from the United Nations and national sources in Latin America does not include data for our countries on disaggregated 
fixed investment except for the broad categories between machinery and equipment, and construction structures. 
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significative policy related variables explaining per capita GDOP growth were inflation and the size of 
the government, however. We tried additional equations (not shown) including foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and infrastructure (per capita telephone lines) but their coefficients were no 
significant (even at the 1% level) in our long-run estimates based on 5-year averages.  
We interpret the findings as indicating that fixed investment was important for growth in 
Latin America but other key related policy variables, mainly those that induced price stability, low 
external debt, reduced government, and education helped made the difference between fast and slow 
growth experiences. Population growth appears to have a slight negative effect and the results are 
showed consistency with other evidence about conditional convergence (see for example, Barro, 
1993, and Loayza et. al, 2004).15  
To examine in more detail the long-run conclusions obtained from the long-run 1960-2002 
estimates we examined the stability of the respective equations and results using the breaks 
indicated above. This procedure seems appropriate given the structural changes and shocks 
experienced by Latin America through that period. The qualifications are based on the structural 
evidence summarized in table 3b equations: 1a through 1e; 2a through 2e; 3a through 3e, and 4a 
through 4e; and from the information shown in figure 3 and Appendix table B1:  
(1) The impact of total fixed investment appeared significant in all of the sub-periods considered 
but the coefficients are higher in the 1980s and in the 1990s. The growth slump of the 1980s 
was to a great extent reflected also an investment slum.16 The growth recovery during 1990-
2002, though modest, appeared to have been supported by a recovery of investment and 
boost from investments in machinery and equipment (see below), which were stimulated by 
the trade reforms and privatization processes. The recovery in the 1990s was not uniform 
across countries, however, as can be observed in figure 3 and Appendix table B1. In the 
cases of Chile, Brazil, and Mexico the recovery of investment rates and GDP growth were 
stronger as compared to Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela.  
(2)The stability of the equations containing investment on per capita GDP growth is confirmed 
half of the twelve Chow Test F values shown for the group of equations 1 through 4. When 
adding policy related variables the stability of the estimates is confirmed also for half of the 
six Chow test F values (with a 5% rejection area). Fixed investment showed to be significant 
in all the equations 1a through 4d. The significance of the policy related variables varied 
throughout the 1960-2002 period, however (equations 3a through 4e). The Chow structural 
break test shows structural stability for 1960-90/1991/2002 break and it fails to accept 
stability including the 1980s as a separate break. We interpret these results as indication that 
the 1980s deviate from the long-term pattern observed and that this decade constitutes a 
special case for the drawing of general observations drawn for the whole 1960-2002 period.  
                                                     
(3)Specific observations about the influence of the policy related variables through the period 
are: (a) inflation appears significant before the 1990s; (b) trade “openness” become 
significant in the 1990s; (b) external debt appears significant before the 1980 and after the 
1980s; (c) government consumption show significance before 1990s; (d) FDI shows 
significance in the annual equation for the whole period and also before the 1990s; (e) 
infrastructure also shows significance in the annual equation for the whole period and 
before the 1990s; and (f) education loses significance after the 1990s.  
15  Per capita GDP growth in the right side of the equations has been computed as the first difference in natural log terms between 
consecutive periods (ln yt- ln yt-1). Thus, a 3% rate is measured as 0.03. This is relevant for an appropriate interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients and the derived elasticities. 
16  Serven and Solimano (1992b) also remarked the investment slump during the 1980s and the slow recovery during the early 1990s as a 
factor contributing to the slow growth recovery after the 1980s. 
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Figure 3 
GDP GROWTH AND TOTAL INVESTMENT RATES 



























































































Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
 
Observation 5: The contribution of Investment in Machinery and Equipment to per capita 
GDP growth is higher than the contribution from investment in construction structures. 
Combined with some key policy related variables, inflation, the share of government consumption 
in GDP, the size of external debt in terms of GDP, and education, per capita GDP growth is 
better explained overall. 
In table 3a we also show OLS regressions for per capita GDP growth on fixed investment 
separated between machinery and equipment, construction structures, and we included as control 
variables the same policy related variables that we used for the total investment equation estimates (we 
also used country fixed effects and corrected for heterocedasticity as needed). This procedure allows 
us to compare across similar equations the robustness of the estimates. From the results, shown in table 
3a, we found that when fixed investment is in the form of machinery and equipment the impact of 
growth is higher as compared to overall investment (see equations 1 through 4 compared to equations 
5 through 11). The regression coefficients of machinery and equipment are higher than those for total 
fixed investment for equations that included the same additional explanatory variables.  
We found that investments in construction structures played a non-significant role as a factor 
explaining per capita GDP growth when considering the whole 1960-2002 period (see regressions 
7,8, and 9 in table 3a). The primary role of machinery investments as a source of growth has been 
supported by the empirical evidence provided by De Long and Summers (1991 and 1993). The 
social returns of machinery investments are higher than investments in construction structures 
because machinery (and equipment) investments embody new technologies that are more 
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dynamically updated and spread through different activities and sectors. Construction structures last 
longer and the direct and indirect impact on production processes is subject to higher inflexibility 
than machinery and equipment. In addition, imported machinery provides an effective vehicle to 
acquire modern technologies. 
When combined with other key policy related variables the explanatory power of the 
estimated equations increased. The policy variables that showed to matter the most when combined 
with machinery and equipment in the long-run equation benchmarks were inflation and government 
consumption (see equations 9, 10, and 11). The significance of education declined when combined 
with machinery and equipment, however. As new machinery and equipment is combined with 
upgraded labor, the impact of education could be captured by machinery and equipment investment.  
The effect of machinery and equipment and construction structures has varied across time, 
however.  
(1) Investments in machinery and equipment showed to be very significant as a factor 
explaining per capita GDP growth in all the sub-periods considered along 1960-2002 (see 
equations 4a through 11e). The sizes of the coefficients of machinery and equipment rise 
in the 1980s and thereafter as compared to the previous years. The growth slump of the 
1980s was reflected in lower shares of machinery and equipment investments (see figure 4 
and Appendix table B2). The shares of machinery and equipment (as percent of GDP) 
recovered after the 1980s to about the levels observed in the 1960s and 1970s triggering 
also a recovery of per capita GDP, though at a pace below the 1960s and 1970s. Mexico 
led the countries with higher shares of machinery and equipment in the 1960s, and Brazil 
and Venezuela led in the 1970s, likely reflecting the more advanced stage of import 
substitution of reached in these countries.  
The shares of machinery and equipment in GDP shrank across countries in the 1980s except 
in the case of Chile which managed to increase the share of machinery and equipment 
investment. Chile also led the six countries in terms of machinery and equipment 
investments (in terms of GDP) in the 1980s and 1990s (including the early 2000s). Despite 
the modest recovery after the 1980s, machinery and equipment were more effective as a 
factor contributing to growth (as indicated by the increase in the size of the coefficients 
observed in equations 4d, 6d, 7d, 8d, 9d, 10d, and 11d, compared to the estimates for other 
sub-periods). It is likely that under the new outward looking development model the trade 
reforms and associated trade liberalization increased the productivity of machinery and 
equipment through new technologies acquired through imports. 
(2) Although, investment in construction structures showed little significance (t-values) as a 
factor contributing to per capita GDP growth during 1960-2002, a slightly positive impact 
appeared to develop after the 1980s (see equations 8d, 9d, and 10d). However, the shares 
of investment in construction structures in GDP on average moved only slightly higher 
after the 1980s while per capita GDP moved from negative growth rates to positive 
growth rates. In other words, construction structures did not play a leading role as a 
growth factor either in the 1980s or in 1990s (and early 2000s), though in the latter the 
social return of investment in construction structures as measured by the equation 
coefficients increased (see also figure 4). It is likely that the increase return of 
construction structures emerged in part as a result of the reduced role of subsidized 
housing constructions during the period of outward orientation and more reduced role of 
state participation.  
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(3) Specific observations about the influence of the policy related variables are in general similar 
to the equations for total fixed investment: (a) inflation loses significance after the 1980s; (b) 
trade “openness” become significant in the 1990s; (b) external debt appears significant 
before the 1980s and after the 1990s; (c) government consumption show significance before 
the 1990s; (d) FDI shows significance in the annual equation for the whole period and before 
the 1990s; (e) infrastructure shows significance in the annual equation for the whole period 
and before the 1990s; and (f) education shows significance before the 1990s. The 
replacement of total fixed investment by machinery and equipment investment changed 
somewhat the relative relevance of the different policy related variables but the overall lung-
run trends and structural qualifications remain almost the same.  
 
Figure 4 
GDP GROWTH, MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, AND CONSTRUCTION RATES 
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Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
 
Observation 6: Human Capital as measured by secondary education appeared to be a 
key factor contributing to productivity growth, but lost significance after the 1980s. 
Education appeared as a significative variable in most of the long-run equations that 
contained total fixed investment or machinery and equipment plus other key policy related 
variables. In three of the five equations in which education was included its coefficient was 
significative at least at the 10% level (see equations 3, 4, 9, and 11 in table 3a). The effect of 
education on growth loses some significance when ruining with machinery and equipment 
investment instead of total investment (equation 10 compared to equation 3). As newer 
machinery and equipment requires increased training skills, part of the education effect could be 
being captured by investments in machinery and equipment. This is, however, and hypothesis 
that would require further testing the educational requirements associated to the different types 
and vintages of machinery and equipment. 
The three countries with the lowest secondary enrollment ratios in 2001 were Venezuela 
(66%), Colombia (70%) and Mexico (73%). The other three countries had ratios above 80%: 
Chile (85%), Argentina (97%) and Brazil (100%). Although the largest potential for additional 
growth by raising secondary enrollment is stronger for the three countries having the lowest 
secondary enrolment ratios (Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela), the potential impact of 
education applies to all countries as well if we interpret the indicator of education as a proxy for 
a broader measure of human capital. Data on education (WDI, 2002and Barro and Lee, 2003) 
provide indicators of education with a span of five years only and the data is not adjusted for 
quality, however. The quality component should add strength to the educational stock and 
therefore to the impact on growth, which becomes evident from the increasing demand for new 
skills to innovate in more efficient and competitive production processes and for adopting newer 
technologies incorporated in new machinery and equipment.17 
Observations about the stability of the relationship between education and per capita GDP 
growth during 1960-2002 are also relevant. We have found evidence showing that secondary 
education was an important factor contributing to per capita GDP growth during the 1960s and 
1970s but its role gradually lost force in the 1980s and further in the 1990s and 2000s (equations 
3a through 3e; 4a through 4e; 9a through 9e; 10a through 10e; and 11a through 11e):  
                                                     
17  We use the data on gross enrollments in secondary education from the WDI 2004, measured as the ratios of total secondary school 
enrollment to the population of secondary age group. See also Appendix A for description of variables and sources. Series measuring the 
quality of secondary education should add insights to the impact of education on growth. This is a line of statistical development that 
would enrich future research on economic growth. 
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(1) Education appeared to be more significant in explaining per capita GDP growth in the 
1960s and 1970s (see equations 3b, 4b, 9b, 10b, and 11b). In the 1980s education 
appeared significant in the equations that included the most significant policy related 
variables: inflation and government consumption (these are the two variables that 
showed high significance in most of the equations in table 3b). When adding other 
policy related variables (in addition to inflation and government consumption) 
education loses significance in the 1980s (see equations 3c and 10c). This period was 
subject to many disturbances, however, induced by debt restructuring and adjustment 
programs, which make it difficult to interpret the declining significance of education 
during the 1980s. 
(2) What appeared interesting in the estimates, however, was the lost of significance of 
education as an explanatory variable during 1991-2002 (see equations 3d, 4d, 9d, 10d, and 
11d). To some extent the modernization of investment, especially of machinery and 
equipment, could be capturing the use of additional educational skills, but most importantly, 
it may be reflecting the declining role of secondary enrollments as they reaches near the 
100% of the population of secondary age. Our education variable measures the ratio of 
secondary enrollment (ration to the population of secondary age). As most of the population 
of secondary age becomes enrolled the room for additional enrollments narrows. This is 
telling us that in the 1960s and 1970s the role of increasing the coverage of secondary 
education was very relevant for economic growth, but that this effect has gradually eroded. 
This does not mean, however, that education is not longer relevant. It means that other ways 
of expanding education are becoming increasingly more relevant such as improving on the 
quality of education and the supply of new forms of human capital formation. The evidence 
suggests that new impetus should be given to education as a force of growth, that first 
generation educational policies should be gradually replaced by a second generation of 
education policies increasingly focus on strengthening the effectiveness educational stock. 
Quality seems to be at the center of the international experiences with second generation 
educational policies (the importance given to education in the Asian countries is an example 
of the second generation type of education). 
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III. Composition of investment 
between private and public 
sector investment 
In this section we examine the incidence of the sectoral 
composition of investment on per capita GDP growth. We disaggregated 
fixed investment between private and public sector investment and 
obtained estimates for the role played by private and public investment 
in the process of economic growth. As for the decomposition of 
investment between machinery and equipment and construction 
structures, some previous evidence have also been found regarding the 
effects of private and public investment on economic growth (see for 
example: Easterly and Rebelo 1993; Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Khan 
and Reinhart, 1990, and Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven, and Solimano, 1996a). 
In the literature seems to be consensus that these two components of 
investment may have a differential impact on growth depending of the 
context in which they take place and if public investment becomes a 
complement or substitute of private investment.  
Public investment that complements private investment appears to 
increase investment productivity and economic growth. Public 
investment in education and infrastructure show strong 
complementarities to private investment and have positive effects on 
economic growth. Public investment may on the other side become a 
substitute of private investment and reduce aggregate investment returns 
and economic growth. Public investment may crowd out private 
investment by using scarce resources and adversely affect growth 
through the implementation of investment projects of low or negative  
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social returns. Thus, academics and policy makers have been increasingly aware that it is not only the 
level of total of investment that matters, but also its composition between private and public 
investment. 
Evidence of the impact of private and public investment on growth has important practical 
implications. It shows the need to rationalize public investment budgets and allocate public resources 
to projects that offer the highest social rates of return, seek opportunities for complementarities with 
private investment, and find room for counter-cyclical investment policies, when the macroeconomic 
framework permits. The implications for public investment policy are especially relevant for 
macroeconomic policy also if, as we show below, private investment and growth present mutually 
causality, opening the possibilities for the creation of virtuous and vicious cycles. In this section we 
show evidence for our six Latin American countries during the whole 1960-2002 that private 
investment has had a positive impact on per capita GDP growth, that public investment has had (on 
average for the whole period and six countries) a non-significant effect on growth, and that the 
combination of private investment with other key policy variables helps further increase per capita 
GDP growth. The evidence leads us to draw our next observation regarding the investment-growth 
process in Latin America during 1960-2002: 
Observation 7: The contribution of Private investment to growth has been positive and 
strong. The contribution of Public investment has not been very significative. Price stability 
appeared as a leading policy related factor adding to per capita GDP growth. 
In table 4a and 4b we show a selected number of OLS estimated equations for per capita GDP 
growth against private investment, public investment, and a selected set of key policy variables. In 
table 4a we show our benchmark long-run estimates and in table 4b the estimates used for the 
structural break analysis. As for regressions in tables 3a and 3b we also used country fixed effects and 
corrected for heterocedasticity as needed. As in the previous estimates, per capita GDP growth has 
been approximated by the first differences of the natural logs of per capita GDP. However, for the 
private-public investment estimates shown in table 4a we used data for the period 1970-2002 at current 
prices in local currencies and we used 3-year averages (instead of the 1960-2002 period and 5-year 
averages used in the previous long-run estimates).  
Table 4a 
GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH DETERMINANTS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
Pool OLS Estimates for Growth of Real GDP per capita 
Sample: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
Three-year averages: 1970-2002. Number of observations: 62 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Private investment (% GDP) 0.0032 0.00417* 0.0042* 0.0038* 0.0036*
 (1.62) (1.82) (1.95) (1.75) (1.77)
Public investment (% GDP) 0.0024 0.0024 0.0017 0.0022
 (0.92)
-0.00002***
 -2.70 (2.60) -2.46
Government consumption (% GDP)  -0.0030**
  (-2.28)
External debt (% GDP) -0.0290 
 (-0.93) 
Per capita GDP (ln of value at -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0044*** -0.0005***
each sub-period)  (-3.01) -3.32 (-3.23) ) (73.46)
R sq 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.36 0.41
F stat 2.44 2.34 2.78 2.62 3.20
(0.91) (0.63) (0.88)
Inflation (annual %) -0.00002*** -0.00003**
(-2.94
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis; Asterisks mean: statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***). 
Fixed effects; Corrected for Heterocedasticity. 
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The only available series of investment divided between private and public investment are 
those compiled by the IFC and the WDI. The series are available for the period 1970 onward and 
are at current prices only. We found that the data for our six selected Latin American countries 
were the best of Latin American countries. Data on public investment of other countries did not 
either cover public enterprises or the series had a short history. We preferred to avoid mixing 
weak data with good data despite sacrificing the number of observations. Data from United 
Nations on national accounts contain longer historic series but for the central and general 
governments only, which exclude the public enterprises.  
We reduced the averages of the variables from 5-year to 3-year in order to compensate for 
the shortage of the estimation period. As for the estimates in tables 3a and 3b we also obtained in 
this case similar results for the whole 1970-2002 period when using 3-year averages (62 
observations) and annual data (178 observations), which help to reinforce the main conclusions 
contained in Observation 7, and which is based on the benchmark log-run estimates of table 4a. 
As for our previous observations, due qualifications are drawn from the structural break analysis 
based on the results shown in table 4b, however.  
 
Table 4b 
GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH DETERMINANTS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
Sample: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela 























Private investment (% GDP)  0.0032 0.0034*** 0.0104*** 0.0033 0.0109*** 0.0052*** 0.0036* 
(1.62) (2.50) (3.57) (0.94) (5.01) (2.55) (1.73) 
Per capita GDP (ln of value at  -0.0004*** 0.0017** -0.0014 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0018 
beginning of each sub-period) (-3.01) (1.93) (-1.01) (0.64) (-0.83) (0.51) (1.72) 
R sq 0.24 0.15 0.37 0.12 0.43 0.18 0.12 
F stat 2.44 30.93 25.57 8.59 38.10 26.24 15.55 
  
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  4.36     
1970-80/1981-2002  3.13     
1970-91/1992-2002  1.58     
 
























Private investment (% GDP)  0.00417* 0.0037** 0.0100*** 0.0030 0.0139*** 0.0047** 0.0035* 
 (1.82) (2.41) (4.08) (0.82) (5.85) (2.09) (1.62) 
Public investment (% GDP) 0.0024 0.0008 -0.0073* -0.0033 0.0120** -0.0011 -0.0006 
 (0.92) (0.48) (-0.38) (-1.90) (-0.79) (2.04)  (-0.23) 
Per capita GDP (ln of value at  -0.0004*** 0.0014 -0.0025 0.0013 -0.0028** 0.0005 0.0018* 
beginning of each sub-period) -3.32 (1.63) (-1.76) (0.75) (-2.41) (0.44) (1.74) 
R sq 0.26 0.15 0.44 0.13 0.51 0.17 0.12 
F stat 2.34 14.03 16.69 4.63 23.01 11.36 7.74 
Chow tests:        
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  4.86       
 
1.65      




























Private investment (% GDP)  0.0042* 0.0042*** 0.0108*** 0.0030 0.0138*** 0.0046** 0.0044** 
 (1.95) (2.85) (5.51) (0.81) (5.62) (2.09) (2.14) 
Public investment (% GDP) 0.0024 0.0006 0.0044* -0.0036 0.0111* -0.0006 -0.0013 
 (0.91) (0.36) (1.49) (-0.89) (1.74) (-0.20) (-0.54) 
 
(-6.17) (-3.41) (1.37) (-1.83) (-4.49) 
Per capita GDP (ln of value at  -0.0004*** 0.0003 -0.0056*** 0.0009 -0.0027** 0.0003 0.0002 
beginning of each sub-period) (-3.23) (0.31) (-3.58) (0.52) (-2.27) (0.22) (0.15) 
0.34 0.18 0.73 0.21 0.51  0.21 
F stat 2.78 11.01 28.19 5.15 15.32 (8.72) (8.94) 
Chow tests:        
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  5.38      
1970-80/1981-2002  2.99      
1970-91/1992-2002   2.33     
Inflation (annual %) -0.00002*** -0.00002*** -0.0003*** -0.00003*** 0.00001 -0.00001* -0.00003*** 



























Private investment (% GDP)  0.0038 * 0.0039** 0.0116*** 0.0017 0.0121*** 0.0041 0.0050  
(1.75)  (2.66) (8.64) (0.40) (5.41) (1.60) (2.36)*** 
Public investment (% GDP) 0.0017  -0.00009 0.0052* -0.0032 -0.0042 0.0137** -0.0005 
 (0.63)  (-0.05) (1.81) (-1.07) (2.27) (-0.19) (-1.26) 
Inflation (annual %) -0.00002 *** -0.00002** -0.0003*** -0.00003*** 0.000008 -0.00002 -0.00003 
 (2.60)  (-2.44) (-8.37) (-3.62) (1.29) 
 (-0.93)  (-1.83) (-2.45) (-1.47) (-2.63) (-0.63) (-2.60)***  
Per capita GDP (ln of value at  -0.0044 *** 0.0001 -0.0057*** 0.0009 -0.0031** 0.0003 -0.0003 
beginning of each sub-period) (-2.94)  (0.10) (-4.36) (0.55) (-2.80) (0.24) -(0.26) 
R sq 0.36  0.20 0.76 0.23 0.55 0.19 0.26 
2.62  9.40 24.39 4.38 13.37 6.58 8.81 
Chow tests:         
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002   5.25     
 
(-1.84)* (-4.21)*** 
External debt (% GDP) -0.0290  -0.0414* -0.0874** -0.0565 -0.1081** -0.0168 -0.0667 
F stat  
 
      
1970-91/1992-2002   2.80      
 
1970-80/1981-2002  2.49  
44 




















Private investment (% GDP)  0.0036* 0.0108 0.0136 0.00520.0044*** 0.0049 *** 0.0054*** *** 
 (1.77) (5.32) (1.27) )   
Public investment (% GDP) 0.0022 0.0011 0.0051 -0.0007 0.0110 -0.0007 0.0007  
)    (0.25) 
*** 
(-2.44) (1.30) -1.80 -4.49 
Governm. consumption (%GDP) -0.0030** -0.0019* -0.0028 -0.0033 -0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0020 
 (-2.28) (-1.69) (-0.96) (-0.93) (-0.28 -1.51 -0.92)   
      
       
-0.0005*** 0.0002 -0.000003 -0.0055*** 0.0003 -0.0027** 0.0001 
beginning of each sub-period) (73.46) (0.22 (-3.35) (0.18) 0.002 )  (-2.23) 0.05  
R sq 0.41 0.21 0.73 0.29 0.51 0.23 0.26 
3.20 9.56 20.30 11.25 7.94 8.01 
    
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  5.37      
1970-80/1981-2002      2.87  
 
The countries that have promoted private investment and have reinforced price stability, 
reducing the associated vulnerabilities and uncertainties caused by high inflation, have enjoyed 
faster per capita GDP growth. Chile, Colombia, and Mexico have performed better while Argentina 

















(3.13) (5.34 (2.51) (2.62)
(0.88 (0.62) (1.65) (-0.19) (1.71) (-0.27)
Inflation (annual %) -0.00003** -0.00002** -0.0003*** -0.00003** 0.000009 -0.00002* -0.00003
 -2.46 (-2.31) (-6.04) 
External debt (% GDP) 
F stat 5.20
Chow tests:    
1970-91/1992-2002  2.32     
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis; Asterisks mean: statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***). 
Fixed effects; Corrected for Heterocedasticity. 
 
Our long-run estimates for the period 1970-2002 shown in table 4a show that private 
investment was a main driving force of per capita GDP growth, with public investment playing a 
negligible role. We also found evidence that the inflation was also very significant in explaining 
per capita GDP growth (see equations 3,4, and 5). The coefficients appeared all significant at the 
1% level and improved the explanatory power of the equations when combined with private 
investment (see the Rsqs. and the F values). We also found that conditional convergence 
appeared significative in theses estimates (we included in this case as a dependent variable the 
initial per capita GDP at the beginning of each 3-year sub-period). 
These estimates could be interpret as showing evidence of some existing inefficiencies in the 
management of government finances of the six largest countries of the region when considering the 
whole 1970-2002 period. The results also help to understand the importance of appropriate 
economic policies as additional ingredients of the growth processes. Government consumption 
showed low significance in the long-run equations (but no significance in the sub-periods; see 
below). External debt was not significative as well as other variables not explicitly shown 
(openness, FDI, and infrastructure). Education did not show significance in this exercise. Reasons 
for this result could include: (1) the shorter period used in this case (1970-2002 compared to 1960-
2002 in the previous datasets); (2) that private investment maybe capturing some highly correlated 
impacts from other policy variables; and (3) that progress on increasing the ratio of secondary 
enrollments increasingly eroded through the 1960-2002 as the ratios were getting closer to 100% 
(some evidence of this was shown earlier). 
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discouraging both private investment and economic growth. Price instabilities increase the exposure 
to vicious cycles and reduce the leverage for counter-cyclical fiscal policies. 
Some qualifications regarding the stability of our long-run estimates are the following (see 
table 4b): 
(2) In the case of public investment, we observe some dissimilar incidence within the 1970-
2002 period. The contribution of public investment to per capita GDP growth acquired 
significance only in the 1990s. In the 1970s and 1980s public investment appeared not 
significative. It is likely the fiscal reforms and rationalization of public budgets in the 
second half of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s strengthened the complementarities 
between public and private investment and, thus, its significance as a factor contributing 
to per capita GDP growth. We also observe in the 1990s an increasing dispersion in the 
shares of public investment across the six countries (see figure 5). Colombia and 
Venezuela reported the highest shares of public investment in GDP but also performed the 
poorest in terms of economic growth. Chile’ economic growth was the highest with an 
average share of public investment in GDP near 6 percent, more that 2 percentage points 
below that of Colombia and 4 percentage points below that of Venezuela. This tells us that 
the contribution of public investment to economic growth is more country specific and 
that aggregate conclusions could be misleading. In the case of Chile public investment did 
not appear to have been a major constraint on economic growth. 
(3) Some specific observations about the influence of the policy related variables emerge 
from the structural analysis: (a) inflation loses significance after the 1980s; (b) 
government consumption did not show significance in any of the sub-periods used for the 
structural tests; (c) external debt appears significant before the 1980s and after the 1990s. 
the non-significance of government consumption when combined with private investment 
help to strengthen the evidence of the reduced direct role of the government in 
contributing to per capita GDP growth, though country specific exceptions could also 
apply.  
(1) The structural tests show stability of the estimates when breaking the period into 1970-
80/1981-2002 and 1970-91/1992-2002, but not when including the 1980s as a separate break 
(see last rows of equations 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, and 5a). As for the estimates for total investment 
and the composition of investment between machinery and equipment and construction 
structures, the 1980s appeared to be “different” as compared to the global period and rest of 
sub-periods. This should not be strange given the series of domestic and external shocks 
suffered by Latin American countries in the 1980s. In particular, the spread of debt 
restructurings, stabilization, and reforms combined with lack of external financing and 
negative per capita GDP growth made that period significantly different to the others. The 
estimates show that in the 1980s neither private nor public investment seemed were leading 
factors contributing to the decline of per capita GDP growth. Inflation showed to be the main 
explanatory variable of growth performance in the 1980s. The results seem consistent with 
previous estimates and also considering that Latin American countries entered a phase of 
strong monetary adjustment to cut inflationary expectations and re-establish domestic 
equilibrium. Stabilization was assigned priority in the 19980s while structural reforms 
acquired an increasing role during the 1990s. After the 1980s, we observe higher shares of 
private investment in GDP along with a recovery of economic growth, though economic 
growth in the 1990s was on average below the rates observed in the 1970s, except for the 
case of Chile (see figure 5 and Appendix table B3).  
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Figure 5 









































































































































Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
 
Observation 8: Private Investment and economic growth show mutual causality, inducing 
virtuous and vicious cycles between private investment and economic growth.  
Table 5a shows a series of estimates for private investment rate (% of GDP; based on data at 
current prices) during 1970-2002. We follow the same statistical approach applied in the previous 
estimates (panel OLS estimations with fixed country effects). From the larger set of equation trials 
we selected the best five equations (in terms of explanatory powers and economic and statistical 
significances of the control variables). In table 5b we show the annual estimates for the whole 
period and the sub-periods used to qualify the long run estimates. Similar results are obtained for 
the annual equation and the equations using the 3-year averages for the whole 1970-2002 period 
(our benchmark long-run equation) (178 and 62 observations, respectively, reinforcing the 
conclusion stated as Observation 8. Some additional results are provided from the structural break 
analysis based on the estimates shown in table 5b. 
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Table 5a 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT DETERMINANTS 
Pool OLS Estimates for Growth of Real GDP per capita 
Sample: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela 
Three-year averages: 1970-2002. Number of observations: 62 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Public investment rate (% GDP) -0.2363* -0.2330** -0.2035     
 (-1.83) (-2.14)   (-1.52)    
Per capita GDP growth (%)  26.43*** 34.04*** 26.50*** 35.42  ***  
  (3.07) (3.31) (3.044) (3.70)    
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 0.9010 0.9608 1.0758 1.014***  *** ***  ***  
 (4.29) (5.71)  (4.94  (6.79)  ) 
 ***  2.8867*** 
    (4.88)  (3.61) (3.49) 
R sq 0.65 0.71 0.65 0.67 0.71 0.67  0.57 
 19.02 15.80 17.01 12.23 
 
Infrastr. (telephone lines per capita)  2.5217  2.2830*** 
F stat 14.05 16.26 13.11
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis; Asterisks mean: statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***). 
Fixed effects; Corrected for Heterocedasticity. 
 
Table 5b 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT DETERMINANTS 
Sample: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela 























Public investment rate (% GDP) -0.2363* -0.2993*** -0.2265 -0.6502 -0.2354** -0.1171 * -0.2855*** 
(-1.83) (-3.55) (-1.15) (-0.92) (-2.81) (-2.59) (-2.19) 
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 0.9010*** 0.6275*** 0.2312 0.3598 -0.0643 0.3362** 0.8300*** 
 (4.29) (4.19) (0.28) (0.74) (-0.53) (2.23) (2.55) 
Infrastr. (telephone lines per capita)        
   
R sq 0.65 0.51 0.65 0.50 0.77 0.57 0.50 
F stat 14.05 177.06 90.15 60.86 154.43 152.21 114.07 
Chow tests:          
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  9.70        
1970-80/1981-2002  5.17        

























Public investment rate (% GDP) -0.2330** -0.2856*** -0.0298 -0.0792 -0.7223** -0.2437*** -0.2254** 
 (-2.14) (-3.72) (-0.18) (-0.60) (-2.85) (-2.38) (-2.21) 
Per capita GDP growth (%) 26.43*** 17.34*** 25.13*** 8.98 16.06*** 11.24** 29.81*** 
 (1.42) (4.79) (2.99) (2.13) 
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 0.9608*** 0.6230*** 0.2743 0.2360 0.0081 0.3336*** 0.7377*** 
 (5.71) (4.66) (0.42) (0.46) (0.09) (2.48) (2.38) 
Infrastr. (telephone lines per capita)        
   
 0.55 0.72 0.52 0.85 0.61 0.52 
F stat 16.26 105.36 60.72 32.02 122.87 88.06 62.31 
Chow tests:          
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  10.32        
1970-80/1981-2002  5.10        
 5.90         
 (3.07) (3.49) (3.19)  
R sq 0.71
1970-92/1993-2002   
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Public investment rate (% GDP) -0.2035 -0.1672** -0.1293 0.0554 -0.6957*** -0.1249 -0.1803** 
 (-1.52) (-2.20) (-0.57) (0.45) (-3.05) (-1.20) (-2.00) 
Per capita GDP growth (%) 34.04*** 21.39*** 23.98*** 5.39 24.70*** 15.25*** 15.72*** 
 (3.31) (4.44 (3.02 (0.87) (4.40 (3.09 (2.94)) )  ) )  
*** -2.6842*** 2.1942*** 2.2310*** 
 (3.49) (6.39) (0.88) (2.32) (-2.39) (3.80) (3.56) 
R sq 0.67 0.59 0.72 0.55 0.86 0.64 0.53 
F stat 13.11 122.54 61.18 36.18 139.77 101.23 64.83 
Chow tests:          
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  9.52        
 4.69       
1970-92/1993-2002  4.71     
Infrastr. (telephone lines per capita) 2.5217*** 2.5421*** 1.2122 3.5042
1970-80/1981-2002  
























Per capita GDP growth (%) 26.50*** 18.07*** 25.50*** 9.34 30.79*** 17.81*** 11.60** 
 (3.044) (3.64) (3.46) 1.54 (4.34) (3.51) (2.16) 
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 1.0758*** 0.7473*** 0.3019 0.2063 0.0754 0.4041*** 0.8383*** 
 (6.79) (5.53) (0.46) (0.42) (0.64) (3.03) (2.76) 
R sq 0.71 0.55 0.72 0.51 0.80 0.61 
123.93  
Chow tests:          
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  11.74        
1970-80/1981-2002  6.76        
1970-92/1993-2002  6.15           
0.50 
























Per capita GDP growth (%) 35.42*** 23.13*** 25.85*** 5.40 29.86*** 17.33*** 16.54*** 
 (3.70) (4.79) (3.47) (0.87) (4.07) (3.59) (3.04) 
Foreign direct investment (% GDP)        
      
Infrastr. (telephone lines per capita) 2.8867*** 2.7964*** 0.7591 3.3653*** -0.3993 2.3360*** 2.5422*** 
 (4.88) (8.32) (0.74) (2.32) (-0.32) (4.69) (3.93) 
R sq 0.67 0.60 0.72 0.55 0.80 0.65 0.52 
F stat 15.8 259.52 123.29 73.37 199.28 221.32 125.20 
Chow tests:          
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  8.96        
     
1970-92/1993-2002  3.70           
  
























Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 1.014*** 0.7556*** 0.4584 0.3225 0.0449 0.4204*** 0.9384*** 
 (4.94) (4.96) (0.57) (0.68) (0.29) (2.78) (2.92) 
R sq 0.65 0.50 0.64 0.50 0.71 0.57 0.48 
17.01 28.94 17.63 10.18 20.81 26.07 17.73 
   
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  10.64        
1970-80/1981-2002  6.53        
 6.33          
F stat 
Chow tests:       
1970-92/1993-2002  
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Infrastr. (telephone lines per capita) 2.2830*** 2.5677*** 0.9204 3.8529*** -2.0325 2.4198*** 2.2747*** 
 (3.61) (6.69) (0.86) (2.88) (-1.47) (4.35) (3.39) 
R sq 0.57 0.52 0.64 0.54 0.72 0.61 0.47 
F stat 12.23 31.65 17.34 12.15 22.19 30.83 17.00 
Chow tests:          
1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002  10.75        
1970-80/1981-2002  7.33        
1970-92/1993-2002   4.90          
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis; Asterisks mean: statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***). 
Fixed effects; Corrected for Heterocedasticity. 
 
From the results of table 5a we observe that per capita GDP growth appeared as a positive 
and very significative factor contributing to the private investment rates (at the 1% level) (equations 
2 through 5). Combined with Observation 7 the estimates show a mutual causality between private 
investment and growth, which opens the room for virtuous and vicious cycles. An increase (decline) 
of private investment induces an acceleration of per capita GDP growth, and an acceleration 
(decline) of per capita GDP growth induces an increase of private investment. This mutual causality 
between investment and growth has been addressed in some previous studies. 
Serven and Solimano (1992a and 1992b) found a positive correlated cyclical interaction 
between private investment and growth in the context of the 1980s and early 1990s. They 
mentioned the possibility of using public investment to attenuate the mutual reinforcing phase of 
both private investment and economic growth at times of economic contraction, and supporting 
growth stability factors to stimulate private investment and induce a virtuous cycle of recovery and 
growth. They remarked that growth recoveries took longer when, in the declining phase of the 
cycles, public investment was cut excessively and when uncertainty about the policy framework 
delayed the recovery of growth and private investment. We agree with these findings but we would 
stress that our evidence showed that public investment was not a key constraint on economic 
growth and that the use of counter cyclical public investment policies would depend on the 
existence of an appropriate policy framework.  
Our evidence suggests that the “package” of policies matters a lot for economic growth as 
well as investment (especially policies reinforcing price stability), and that the effectiveness of 
public investment is crucial. As shown in figure 5 for the case of Venezuela during 1991-2002, high 
public investment did not guarantee an acceleration of economic growth. In equations 1 through 3 
of table 5a, we found a negative correlation between private and public investment for the whole 
1970-2002 period, indicating that public investment as crowded out rather than crowding private 
investment during 1970-2002. 
We also found that other key factors contributing to private investment during the whole 
1970-2002 were foreign direct investment (FDI) and infrastructure (equations 4 through 7). These 
results could be implying that government policies that have encouraged privatization sales and 
concessions have been effective in promoting private investment (and economic growth). The 
significance of FDI and infrastructure seem inconclusive, however, when adding the structural 
qualifications (see below). 
A further exploration within the whole 1970-2002 period adds relevant qualifications to the 
“long run” 1970-2002 benchmark estimates: 
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(1) The structural break tests (Chow tests) show a clear instability in the coefficients 
obtained in our long run 1970-2002 estimates. In the last columns of table 5b we show 
the Chow tests for three different breaks (1970-80/1981-92/1993-2002; 1970-80/1981-
2002; and 1970-92/1993-2002) under the annual estimates equations corresponding to 
each set of similar equations. The results conduct in all cases to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of stability of the coefficients through 1970-2002. These results could be 
expected taking into consideration the shorter period considered and the structural 
changes that have affected both the incentives and the composition of private and public 
investment. Liberalization of capital flows, privatization, and the rationalization of 
public budgets have become major structural factors affecting private investment 
incentives through the 1970-2002 years not only for the whole region but also with 
different emphasis across countries in the region.  
In the 1970s FDI was highly restricted in most Latin American countries and most 
infrastructure investment was public. This situation gradually changed in the 1980s 
amid a process of strong fiscal and monetary adjustments. In the 1990s, FDI became 
gradually welcome in most countries, infrastructure policies relayed increasingly in the 
participation of the private sector, and public investment was seen increasingly as 
adopting a role of a complement rather than a substitute for private investment. Progress 
on privatization and public sector reforms have also varied across countries. Chile and 
Mexico have been ahead in implementing the reforms affecting capital flows and the 
public sector. Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela have remained behind in improving 
their the public finances. 
(2) The instability of the estimates shown in the structural Chow implies that our “long 
run” observation about the specific form of the mutual causality between private 
investment and per capita GDP growth appears to hold except for the 1980s.  
(3) The estimates in table 5b confirm the negative correlation between public and private 
investment through the various sub-periods show in table 5b (equations 1a through 3f), 
implying that public investment has been more a substitute rather than a complement to 
private investment. 
(4) The estimates show that FDI, and infrastructure showed as main forces driving the 
slump of private investment during 1981-2002 but were not main factors contributing to 
private investment in the 1970s (see equations 1e, 2e, 3e, 4e, 5e, 6e, and 7e, compared 
to equations 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, and 7b). The 1970s was still a decade under the 
previous import substitution model for most countries in Latin America with an 
important participation of the state in the economy, which is likely to have contributed 
to make infrastructure investment and FDI less significative in encouraging private 
investment, though this conclusion is tentative given the instability of the equations 
through the different breaks. For the 1990s we found a non-siginificative correlation 
between FDI and private investment (equations 2d, 4d, and 6d). We also found an 
instable correlation between infrastructure (telephone lines per capita) and private 
investment, and a negative correlation during the 1990s. (equation 3d, 5d, and 7d).  
The interpretation of the results for FDI could lead to the conclusion that FDI did not 
contributed directly to private investment. It could have contributed indirectly through the 
attraction of new technologies, though specific research could allow the drawing of more precise 
conclusions regarding the interactions between FDI and private investment in Latin America.  
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Specific research on this subject is contained for example in the wok of and Lim (2001), 
Borensztein, de Gregorio, and Lee (1998), Olofsdotter (1998).18  
The same applies to the association between infrastructure and private investment given 
the sensitivity of the association.. In a case study about investment and reforms in Latin America 
Moguillansky and Bielschowsky (2000) provided a detailed structural analysis of the incidence 
of infrastructure investments on economic growth for eight Latin American countries during 
1960-2000. Calderón and Servén also studied the role of infrastructure in Latin America during 
1980-2001.19 Although not included in table 5b a separate estimate of the equation for the private 
investment rate against per capita GDP growth and our infrastructure proxy for the period 1991-
2002 instead of 1993-2002 (i.e an equation of type 5) yielded a strong and positive coefficients 
for both per capita GDP growth and infrastructure as factors explaining private investment 
(significative at the 1% level). 
 
                                                     
 
18  Lim provides a survey showing that the literature provides substantial support for positive spillovers from FDI but that there is no 
consensus on the causality from FDI to economic growth. Borensztein et al, found that the level of human capital helps to determine the 
ability to adopt foreign technologies and that FDI may crowd out domestic investment. Olofsdotter found evidence showing that the 
beneficiary effects of FDI depends on institutional capability, which varies across countries. 
19  Moguillansky and Bielschowsky studied eight countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Peru. They analyzed 
the effects of the structural reforms on investment decisions in the 1990s, covering macroeconomic, sectoral and microeconomic aspects 
and found that weak institutions and regulations have limited the benefits from the privatization of investments in infrastructure (including 
the concessions). Calderón and Servén show that Latin America lags behind the international norm in terms of infrastructure quantity and 
quality and that infrastructure investment has fallen in Latin America during, induced by the retrenchment of public investment and the 
limited response of the private sector. They also remark considerable disparities across countries. 
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IV. Conclusions 
In our research we obtained evidence about the contribution of 
investment to economic in Latin America during the period 1960-2002 
based on a sample of six Latin America countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela), representing the region’s 
aggregate trends. These six countries are the larges of the region and 
produce about 90% of total Latin America’s GDP (WDI, 2004, World 
Bank). The selection of countries was also guided by the availability 
and reliability of the data we required. We divided the whole 1960-
2002 period into several sub-periods and disaggregated fixed 
investment by type assets (machinery and equipment, and construction 
structures), and also by sectoral origin between private and public 
investment. In Section I, we examined the contribution of physical 
capital to Latin America’s economic growth. In Section II, we 
examined the contributions of machinery and equipment, and 
construction structures and in, Section III, the contribution of private 
and public investment to per capita GDP growth to per capita GDP 
growth. A shorter period was used in Section III (1970-2002 against 
1960-2002) given the availability ad reliability of the data on private 
and public investment. 
The growth accounting exercises of Section I provided evidence 
of the primary role played by total factor productivity in explaining the 
difference between fast and slow growth experiences, with physical 
playing a secondary role on the growth process of the six largest Latin 
American countries during 1960-2002. Extending the traditional 
growth accounting approach through the incorporation of additional 
elements (adjusting physical capital by its rate of utilization,  
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expressing physical capital in terms of GDP basket units, and decomposing labor between its raw 
and human capital components) did not change the evidence found in other growth accounting 
studies regarding the key role played by total factor productivity in driving economic growth. From 
the evidence we concluded that aggregate fixed investment “per se” did not explain the difference 
between fast growth countries and slow growth countries and that total factor productivity made the 
difference. Total factor productivity reflects all types of cost reductions raising the efficiency in the 
use of production factors, including those induced by the composition of investment and the 
macroeconomic framework. 
In Section II we found that fixed investment was significant in explaining per capita GDP 
growth during 1960-2002, but that key policy related variables were also main factors contributing 
to growth, helping to mark the difference between fast and slow growth experiences. We found that 
main policy related variables contributing to growth were: inflation, trade openness, external debt, 
the size of the, and education. Inflation, a proxy for price stability, showed the most consistent 
significance during 1960-2002, however. 
We found that machinery and equipment was the main part of fixed investment contributing 
to per capita GDP growth, with the role of construction structures playing a secondary role. The 
stability analysis confirmed the significances of total fixed investment and also of machinery and 
equipment investment as factors contributing to per capita GDP growth. Although, investment in 
construction structures showed little significance (t-values) as a factor contributing to per capita 
GDP growth during 1960-2002, a slight positive impact developed after the 1980s. 
We also have found that secondary education was an important force contributing to per 
capita GDP growth during the 1960s and 1970s but its role declined in the 1980s and further in the 
1990s and 2000s, as the coverage of secondary education increased. The evidence suggest that 
education policies should incorporate new forms of expanding the human capital stock, mainly 
through efforts to improve the quality of all type of education and other training that facilitates a 
dynamic adoption of new technologies. 
In Section III, we examined evidence about the influence of investment on per capita GDP 
growth from a sectoral perspective, during 1970-2002. We decomposed fixed investment between 
private and public investment. A shorter period was used in this case given the availability and 
reliability of the data.. As for the estimates in section II, we obtained estimates for the whole period 
and supported the conclusions with qualifications drawn from a structural break analysis. We found 
that the contribution of private investment to growth was positive and strong, that the contribution of 
public investment was not significative, and that inflation was also the main key variable contributing 
to per capita GDP growth that showed systematic and consistent significance. We found that public 
investment was not a key constraint on economic growth. As for the implications drawn from of 
section II, the structural tests showed the 1980s a “atypical” compared to the rest of the years. 
We also found a mutual causality between growth and private investment, which helps to 
understand the formation of vicious and virtuous cycles in Latin America. A contraction (increase) 
of private investment induces a reduction (increase) of per capita GDP growth, which in turn, 
induces a contraction (increase) of private investment. Per capita GDP growth showed consistent 
significance as a main factor explaining private investment rates during 1970-2002. The evidence 
also indicates that a pre-condition for the use of active counter cyclical public investment policies 
would be the prevalence of a stable macroeconomic framework (mainly price stability). Finally, we 
did not find general conclusive evidence about the incidence of FDI and infrastructure on private 
investment or growth in Latin America. Specific case by case observations seem required to 
appreciate the influence of FDI and infrastructure. 
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Appendix A 
Data sources 
Variable Description Source 
GDP  Current and constant prices local 
currency units 
World Development Indicators (WDI). 
World Bank 
Potential GDP Seven year centered average of GDP 
at constant prices  
WDI and own calculations 
GDP Deflator Index of GDP current prices/GDP 
constant prices 
WDI 
Gross fixed capital formation Current and constant prices WDI, United Nations Statistical Office  
Annual labor and capital shares in 
national income. Capital shares 
excludes land and other assets not 
part of the national accounts concept 
of fixed capital formation  
Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLAC), United Nations 
Statistical Office 
Capital stock Fixed Capital derived from the series 
of gross fixed capital formation at 
constant prices (K) and at current 
prices (K*) 
WDI and own calculations 
Labor Employment series Eclac, United Nations Statistical Office 
GDP growth lnGDPt-lnGDP-1 (data at constant 
prices local currency) 
WDI  
Total investment rates % of GDP at constant and current 
prices (data in local currency) 
WDI and national sources (data for 
2002-2002)  
Machinery and equipment, and 
construction rates. 
% of GDP at constant and current 
prices (data in local currency) 
WDI 
% ratio of FDI on GDP, at average 
market exchange rate. 
WDI 
Infrastr. (ln telephone lines per 
capita) 
Ln of average annual per capita 
telephone lines 
WDI and N. Loayza database 
Education (ln ratio second.  
enroll.) 
Ln of the ratio of secondary 
enrollment calculated over secondary 
school age group.  
WDI and own calculations 
Population growth  Annual % rate WDI 
Factor shares 
WDI and national sources (data for 
2002-2002) 
Private and public investment 
rates. 
% of GDP at constant and current 
prices (data in local currency) 
WDI and national sources (data for 
2002-2002) 
Inflation % annual change in the consumer 
price index 
WDI 
Openness (exports+imports)  % ratio of exports+ imports on GDP 
Government consumption  % share of government consumption 
on GDP 
WDI and N. Loayza database 
External debt % ratio of external debt on GDP, at 
average market exchange rate. 
WDI 
Foreign Direct Investment  
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GDP GROWTH AND INVESTMENT RATES a 
Country 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-02
         
Argentina         
GDP growth  4.0 4.0 3.1 3.0 -2.4 -0.3 6.7 -0.3 
GDP per capita growth 2.4 2.5 1.4 1.4 -3.9 -1.6 5.5 -1.2 
Investment rate (current LCU) 22.3 22.4 24.1 28.1 20.6 17.0 17.7 16.8 
Investment rate (constant LCU) 21.7 21.9 23.3 25.1 18.7 16.2 18.1 17.8 
         
Brazil         
GDP growth  4.6 7.8 2.0 10.3 6.7 1.2 2.1 3.2 
GDP per capita growth 1.5 5.0 7.7 4.2 1.6 -0.9 0.3 0.7 
19.7 23.6 22.9 20.8 
Investment rate (constant LCU) 19.3 22.9 19.7 23.6 19.2 21.8 21.2 18.4 
         
Chile         
GDP growth  3.7 4.6 -1.1 7.3 1.1 8.7 6.8 3.8 
1.2 2.5 -2.8 5.7 -0.4 5.0 7.0 2.5 
Investment rate (current LCU) 17.4 18.7 16.8 19.2 14.9 22.8 24.6 24.2 
Investment rate (constant LCU) 33.7 21.7 18.5 17.5 18.7 23.7 29.9 31.5 
 
     
GDP growth  4.7 5.9 5.7 5.4 2.2 4.9 4.1 
1.6 3.2 3.0 0.1 2.9 2.1 -0.7 




Investment rate (current LCU) 18.3 20.3 21.8 24.4 22.4 21.3 21.8 23.2 
Investment rate (constant LCU) 24.7 27.2 26.4 26.5 21.0 17.3 20.0 22.0 
         
   
6.2 3.0 2.8 3.5 -0.4 
GDP per capita growth 2.4 0.7 -0.5 -0.9 -3.4 0.1 1.2 -2.3 
Investment rate (current LCU) 22.7 27.8 31.1 36.5 20.1 19.3 18.7 18.8 
Investment rate (constant LCU) 19.5 21.9 16.3 23.2 29.9 19.6 15.9 16.2 
Investment rate (current LCU) 19.8 19.2 21.8 21.0 
GDP per capita growth 
        
Columbia    
1.1 
GDP per capita growth 2.9 
18.4 19.8 18.9 21.1 17.1 
Investment rate (constant LCU) 18.5 18.9 18.8 18.6 20.2 17.8 20.7 17.2 
         
        
GDP growth  7.2 6.3 7.1 2.0 1.7 1.6 4.0 
GDP per capita growth 4.0 2.9 3.0 4.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Venezuela      
GDP growth  4.0 2.5 -0.9 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
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Table B2 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION SHARES 
Percent of GDP 
Country 1961-65 1966-70 1996-021971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1961-02
          
Argentina          
Total Investment 19.94 20.70 22.15 18.46 18.23 19.6524.72 15.95 17.81
5.93 6.44 7.13 7.13 6.80
  Constructions 14.01 10.8414.88 15.70 17.45 8.81 11.10 10.81 12.85
       
Brazil          
15.31 17.96 18.31 17.41 19.09
  Mach and Equip 5.96 10.27 5.70 5.45 7.01 7.137.41 9.53 3.33 
Total Investment 22.37 20.30 16.26 15.03 15.87 21.24 26.46 24.64 20.48
  Mach and Equip 7.16 7.04 5.39 6.96 6.35 10.33 14.85 9.76 8.54
  Constructions 15.21 13.26 10.87 9.52 11.61 11.948.07 10.91 14.88
          
Colombia          
Total Investment 14.47 15.74 16.08 15.89 17.24 15.49 18.28 15.82 15.74
  Mach and Equip 5.52 6.66 5.66 6.50 6.98 7.34 7.26 5.87 6.31
8.95 10.08 9.58 9.90 11.02 9.43
        
Mexico          
Total Investment 17.50 20.37 19.5021.46 22.25 20.03 16.95 18.58 19.07
  Mach and Equip 6.99 8.12 8.82 9.20 7.71
13.05 12.32 10.32 9.20 9.07
          
Venezuela          
Total Investment 16.12 17.91 26.60 15.66 16.18 14.12 17.7718.02 19.03
5.21
  Mach and Equip 5.82 7.26 7.62 6.99
   
Total Investment 23.52 23.71 17.17 19.30
  Constructions 9.35 10.55 13.25 14.17 12.62 11.72 14.08 12.29 11.97
          
Chile          
  Constructions 8.91 8.83 9.96
  
6.62 9.39 10.00 8.43
  Constructions 10.52 12.24 12.63 11.07
  Mach and Equip 5.48 6.39 7.23 11.50 8.09 6.24 6.02 8.27
  Constructions 10.64 11.63 10.68 15.11 10.94 9.42 10.15 8.91 9.50
Source: ECLAC/UN Statistical Office, and national Sources (1990-2002). 
Notes: Averages of annual shares. Shares are on the basis of data in local currency at constant prices. 
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Table B3 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT RATES 
Percent of GDP 
Country 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 1985-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96 1997-99 2000-02 1970-2002






19.6 23.6 20.6 20.4 24.7 20.1 19.4 21.3
  Private Investment 13.8 16.3 14.3 15.4 14.7 16.0 16.2 19.1 15.814.5 18.9 14.6
5.8 6.6 5.7 5.8
  
   
Total Investment 14.4 14.3 15.0 17.7 12.9 17.8 22.2 22.4 24.0 24.0 22.0 18.8
  Private Investment 6.8 4.3 7.9 12.4 7.8 13.6 17.0 16.9 19.2 18.0 16.6 12.8
  Public Investment 7.5 10.0 7.1 5.3 5.1 4.2 5.2 5.6 4.8 6.0 5.3 6.0
     
Colombia     
Total Investment 17.2 15.8 15.3 16.6 18.1 17.0 17.1 16.3 22.4 17.3 14.3 17.2
  Private Investment 11.3 10.5 9.4 10.0 9.2 10.1 10.4 9.2 14.7 8.8 6.9 10.2
  Public Investment 6.0 5.3 5.9 6.6 8.9 6.9 6.7 7.1 7.7 8.5 7.4 7.0
     
Mexico     
Total Investment 18.8 20.2 20.6 25.0 19.5 19.1 17.9 19.0 17.8 20.5 19.1 19.8
  Private Investment 13.1 12.1 12.5 13.9 11.7 12.9 13.6 15.1 13.9 17.9 16.2 13.9
  Public Investment 5.8 8.0 8.1 11.1 7.8 6.2 4.3 3.9 3.9 2.6 2.9 5.9
     
Venezuela     
na na na 16.0 19.6 17.9 19.8 16.6 17.9 15.4 
  Private Investment na na na na 10.5 11.4 8.1 8.5 7.4 9.6 9.4 9.2
  Public Investment na na na na 5.5 8.3 9.8 11.3 9.2 8.2 6.0 8.6
       
            
20.9 26.1 20.9 16.8
15.4 13.8 12.0 15.2 17.1 13.1 14.6
8.1 7.7 11.6 6.8 4.1 1.6 1.7 1.9 0.9 5.1
  
Total Investment 21.1 23.6 18.2 16.1 18.7 19.0 14.0 19.6
  Private Investment 12.8 13.4 14.5 17.0
  Public Investment 5.4
  
Brazil   
Total Investment 22.9 21.9 19.9 21.0 
  Public Investment 7.5 8.2 6.1 5.3 4.2 3.3 1.9 5.5
   
Chile  
Total Investment na 17.8
Source: World Development Indicators (2004) and International Finance Corporation (IFC) (2001): Trends in Private 
Investment in Developing Countries: Statistics for 1970-2000 and the Impact on Private Investment of Corruption and 
the Quality of Public Investment, Discussion Paper 44, Washington DC 
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